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I. INTRODUCTION

The remarkable rise of administrative agencies in the last century is
considered to be the most significant legal development in the United
States.! In 1951, Justice Robert Jackson remarked that "perhaps more
values today are affected by [the] decisions [of administrative agencies]
than by those of all the courts.",2 The trend has since continued at an
alarming rate.3 Regarding the place that administrative agencies occupy
in the general scheme of the American constitutional system, Justice
Jackson opined:
Administrative agencies have been called quasi-legislative,
quasi-executive or quasi-judicial, as the occasion required, in
order to validate their functions within the separation-ofpowers scheme of the Constitution. The mere retreat to the
qualifying "quasi" is implicit with confession that all recognized
classifications have broken down, and "quasi" is a smooth cover
which we draw over our confusion as we might use a
counterpane to conceal a disordered bed."4
The phenomenon of legislative delegation of policymaking and other
functions to administrative agencies has come to be known as "the
administrative state" or "the fourth branch of government."5 The notion
of the "administrative state" has evidently eroded the traditional
6
distinction between policy making and execution. Merged into one
institution, each administrative agency currently undertakes the
1. STEVEN J. CANN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 8 (4th ed. 2006) (citing Fed. Trade
Comm'n v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting)).
2. Ruberoid, 343 U.S. at 487 (Jackson, J., dissenting).

3. Today, a substantial part of everyday life is regulated by administrative agencies.
See CANN, supra note 1, at 7-8.
4. See Ruberoid, 343 U.S. at 487-88 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
5. See CANN, supra note 1, at 8. The term "fourth branch" was first used by Justice

Jackson in his Ruberoid dissenting opinion. See Ruberoid, 343 U.S. at 487. It means
"bureaucracy as an organization or structure." CANN, supra note 1, at 8. The "fourth
branch" has a broader meaning: "It implies a bureaucracy coequal with the presidency,
Congress, and the courts, and it assumes the policy-making aspect of the administrative
state." Id.
6. CANN, supra note 1, at 8. See generally Peter L. Strauss, The Placeof Agencies in
Government: Separationof Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573 (1984)

("In the pages following I argue that, for any consideration of the structure lawadministration below the very apex of the governmental structure, the rigid separation-ofpowers compartmentalization of governmental functions should be abandoned in favor of
analysis in terms of separation of functions and checks and balances.").
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functions of policymaking, execution, and adjudication at the same time]
In other words, a single administrative agency essentially undertakes
three distinctive functions: (1) legislative functions; (2) informal actions;
and (3) formal adversarial adjudications. 8 The legislative function
involves rulemaking based on delegated authority. 9 Informal actions
include processes such as
application processing, claims
S - informal
10
settlements, and negotiations.
Formal adversarial adjudications are,
however, the "functional[] equivalent to federal civil nonjury trials.""
It has become an unavoidable reality of life that neither the legislative
nor the executive branch of government could effectively control these
diverse functions of administrative agencies. 2 "[A]lmost by default,"
says Professor Cann, "the job of attempting to control agencies has fallen
to the courts, and administrative law is the tool that courts use."' 3
One of the most serious difficulties that the courts face in executing
this function of control is the review of decisions made pursuant to the
extremely diverse, informal, and relaxed procedural and evidentiary
rules of administrative adjudications in light of formal rules of the

7. See CANN, supra note 1, at 8.
8. See Michael H. Graham, Application of the Rules of Evidence in Administrative
Agency FormalAdversarial Adjudications: A New Approach, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 353,
353.
9. See id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Exemplifying the difficulty associated with the control of the functions of
administrative agencies by elected representatives of the people, Professor Cann mentions
the following: In 1966 Congress delegated power to the Department of Transportation
(DOT) to adopt a public policy to minimize the death and injury caused by automobile
accidents. In 1969, the secretary of the DOT adopted a mandatory passive restraint
policy. The successor rescinded the policy, but his decision was reversed by the courts
following a lengthy legal battle. In a way, the process took twenty-three years to
meaningfully effectuate congressional policy. See CANN, supra note 1, at 20-22.
13. Id. at 9. Writing in the British context, Professors Beatson and Matthews suggest:
"The constitutional justification for the court's supervisory jurisdiction is to give effect (a)
to the intentions of the sovereign Parliament and (b) to the principles of checks and
balances inherent in the doctrine of separation of powers and the rule of law." J. BEATSON
& M.H. MATrHEWS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 3 (2d ed. 1989). In
theory, administrative agencies are also subject to legislative and executive oversight; the
exercise of such oversight is, however, very difficult. For example, in the 1970s, the
mechanism of legislative veto was developed. It essentially required the submission of
final administrative decisions to Congress for a possible veto. However, in 1983, the
Supreme Court struck down this mechanism as a violation of article 1, section 7 of the
Constitution. The Court reasoned that the legislative veto amounted to legislation by one
house of Congress. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 956-59 (1983). It is often said that
the President's exercise of oversight is limited to the exercise of the Appointments Clause
of the Constitution by appointing officials who share his political agenda. See CANN,
supra note 1, at 28-29; see also U.S. CONST. art. II., § 2, cl.
2.
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judicial process. Perhaps nowhere is such incongruity more evident than
in administrative immigration deportation proceedings.
In recent years, the Federal Courts of Appeals have been flooded with
ever-increasing appeals from the decisions of the nation's more than 200
immigration judges and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).
According to the Administrative Office of Courts of the United States,
the number of appeals filed in the Federal Courts of Appeals rose a
stunning 515 percent since 2001.14 The New York Times reported that in
the year 2004, "immigration cases, most involving asylum seekers,
accounted for about 17 percent of all federal appeals cases."15 According
to this report, "in New York and California, nearly 40 percent of [all]
'
federal appeals involved immigration cases."16

According to a congressionally mandated Commission on International Religious Freedom report, the disparity in the approval rates of
claims for immigration benefits by individual immigration judges is
staggering.1 7 One extreme example is the disparity in the rate of
approval of immigration cases in a South Florida immigration court.
While one judge averaged less than a 2 percent rate of approval of
applications for asylum, another judge, sitting on the same court,
averaged about a 75 percent approval rate. 8 The Commission further
found that in nearly 40 percent of immigration judge decisions where
relief was denied, the ground for denial involved evidentiary issues,
particularly inconsistencies between the claimant's testimony with his or
her prior statements to an immigration inspector or an immigration
officer." In nearly one-quarter of denials, the grounds for denial was
lack of credibility because of added details. °
A research group associated with Syracuse University examined
297,240 immigration cases decided between 1994 and 2005 and found

14.

See BIA Appeals Remain High in 2nd and 9th Circuits, THIRD BRANCH (Admin.

Office of the U.S. Courts, Washington D.C.), Feb. 2005, available at http://www.uscourts.
gov/ttb/feb05ttb/bia/index.html. For example, in the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, the number of appeals increased by 1,448 percent; in actual figures it rose from
170 to 2,632. Id.
15. Adam Liptak, Courts Criticize Judges' Handling of Asylum Cases, N.Y. TIMES,

Dec. 26, 2005, at Al.
16. Id.
17. See 1 U.S.

COMM'N ON INT'L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, REPORT ON ASYLUM
SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL 7 (2005); Kate Jastram & Tala Hartsough, A-File and

Record of Proceeding Analysis of Expedited Removal, in 2 U.S. COMM'N ON INT'L
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM,

supra, at 44, 67-70.

18. Tayna Weinberg & Ruth Morris, Gatekeepers; Who Gets Asylum? Experts Warn
Bias Might Be Swaying Judges' Decisions, S. FL. SUN-SENTINEL, July 3, 2005, at Hi.
19. Jastram & Hartsough, supra note 17, at 67-68.

20.

Id.
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wide disparities in the disposition of immigration cases." According to
this study, one judge in Miami denied 96.7 percent of asylum cases that
came before him. By a stark contrast
"a New York judge granted ... all
22

but 9.8 percent of such cases.,
Courts of appeals have repeatedly complained about inconsistent,
incoherent, and even outright erroneous decisions. For example, the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit noted "'a disturbing pattern' of
misconduct in immigration rulings that sent people back to countries
where they had said they would face persecution., 23 A notable
expression of frustration is Judge Richard Posner's statement in Pasha v.
Gonzales. There, Chief Judge Posner of the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit stated:
At the risk of sounding like a broken record, we reiterate our
oft-expressed concern with the adjudication of asylum claims by
the Immigration Court and the Board of Immigration Appeals
and with the defense of the BIA's asylum decisions in this court
by the Justice Department's Office of Immigration Litigation.
The performance of these federal agencies is too often
inadequate. This case presents another depressing example."
The central issue in Pasha involved the admissibility of expert
testimony.26 The appellant, Pasha, an Albanian national, sought asylum
on the basis of past persecution she suffered in Albania because of her
political activities." She presented nine documentary evidences to prove
her allegations of persecution.
During the hearing before an
immigration judge, the Immigration Service presented a forensic
documents expert witness, one Gideon Epstein. The witness testified
21.

TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARING HOUSE, IMMIGRATION JUDGES

(2006), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/160/, discussed in Rachel L. Swarns, Study
Finds Disparitiesin Judges' Asylum Rulings, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2006, at A15.

22.

Swarns, supra note 21

CLEARING HOUSE, supra note 21).

(discussing TRANSACTIONAL

RECORDS ACCESS

The study, which examined Justice Department

records, also found significant variations in the approval rates of cases presented by
different nationalities. For example, while 80 percent of all applicants from Haiti and El
Salvador were denied, less than 30 percent of those from Afghanistan or Burma were
denied.

Id. (discussing TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARING HOUSE, supra

note 21).
23. See Liptak, supra note 15 (citing Wang v. Attorney Gen., 423 F.3d 260, 267-70 (3d
Cir. 2005)).
24. 433 F.3d 530 (7th Cir. 2005).
25. Id. at 531 (citation omitted).
26. Id. at 535.
27. Id. at 531. The appellant testified that she was subjected to arrest and severe
physical abuse because of her support for a democratic party in Albania and her political
participation. Id.
28.

Id.
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that he examined four of the nine documents and concluded that they
were "probably not what they're purported to be."2 9 The expert opined
that his conclusion is supported by, among other factors, 0 the difference
between the handwritten text and the printed text in the form in the
Albanian language. Unlike the printed text, the handwritten text did not
contain diacritical or accent marks.3 The expert, however, admitted that
he neither spoke Albanian nor compared the documents at issue with
other official Albanian documents.32 He finally conceded that "he could
not 'rule out' the possibility" that the documents may have been
genuine.33 Predicated on this testimony alone, the Immigration Court
denied Pasha's request for asylum. 4
On review, the court of appeals held that the expert "should not have
been permitted to testify" in the first place.35 The court stated: "Not
knowing Albanian, Epstein was not a proper witness to testify that
Albanian is always written with diacritical marks."36 The court further
stated that although the Supreme Court's ruling in Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals-thatexpert testimony must rest on a reliable
foundation 37-is not strictly applicable in administrative proceedings, the
38
41
"spirit" of the holding
must guide administrative decisions such as this.
As a matter of fact, in the year 2005, the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit reversed 40 percent of the decisions of the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA). 9 The rate of reversal for non-immigration
civil cases within the same period was just 18 percent 0
The courts' complaints prompted Attorney General Alberto Gonzales
to write: "'I have watched with concern the reports of immigration judges
29. Id. at 531-32.
30. Id. The additional reason for the conclusion is the following syllogism: the
documents were generated using color laser technology, which makes only one copy at a
time. These kinds of devices are not ordinarily used to produce forms as they are
expensive. Because Albania is a poor country, such devices could not have been used to
produce the forms. Therefore, the documents were probably not genuine. Id. at 531.
31. Id. at 531-32.
32. Id. at 532.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 535.
36. Id.
37. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993) (holding
that under the Federal Rules of Evidence, "the trial judge must ensure that any and all
scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable").
38. See Pasha,433 F.3d at 535.
39. Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 829 (7th Cir. 2005).
40. Id. ("Federal appeals court judges around the nation have repeatedly excoriated
immigration judges this year for what they call a pattern of biased and incoherent
decisions in asylum cases."); see also Liptak, supra note 15.
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who fail to treat aliens appearing before them with appropriate respect
and consideration and who fail to produce the 4quality of work I expect
from employees of the Department of Justice.'- 1
In Djouma v. Gonzales, Judge Posner remarked that "[u]nfortunately,
the Department of Homeland Security and the Justice Department,
which share responsibility for processing asylum claims, have, so far as
appears, failed to provide the immigration judges and the members of
the Board of Immigration Appeals with any systematic guidance. '' 42 A
frustrated Judge Posner further stated in Benslimane v. Gonzales, that:
This tension between judicial and administrative adjudicators is
not due to judicial hostility to the nation's immigration policies
or to a misconception of the proper standard of judicial review
of administrative decisions. It is due to the fact that the
adjudication of these cases at the administrative
413 level has fallen
below the minimum standards of legal justice.
A number of factors are blamed for these shortcomings;4 however, this
Article argues that the utter informality that characterizes immigration
court proceedings is one of the most serious problems that has resulted in
such profoundly inconsistent, unpredictable, and incoherent adjudication
of immigration cases. In particular, this Article discusses the oftendisregarded lack of workable and systematic formal rules of procedure
and evidence that are compatible with the peculiarities of immigration
proceedings. Exclusively focusing on the quasi-judicial or adversarial
adjudicative functions of administrative agencies-more particularly, the
procedural and evidentiary issues affecting adjudications resulting in the
deportation of non-citizens by immigration courts and the BIA-this
Article proposes the adoption of uniform formal and strictly enforceable
procedural and evidentiary rules modeled after the Department of Labor
(DOL) Rules of Evidence that are predicated on the Federal Rules of
Evidence (FRE) and selectively modified to fit the peculiarities of
adversarial labor proceedings.45

41.

Richard Acello, Immigration Court Review Ordered, ABA J. EREPORT, Jan. 20,

2006, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, ERPORT File (quoting Letter from Alberto
Gonzales, U.S. Attorney Gen., to Immigration Judges (Jan. 9, 2006)).
42. Djouma v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 685,687-88 (7th Cir. 2005).
43. Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 829-30 (7th Cir. 2005).
44. Some of the factors that are blamed for the shortcomings include such practical
issues as lack of resources, high caseload, lack of oversight, and outright misconduct. See,
e.g., Stephen H. Legomsky, Deportation and the War on Independence, 91 CORNELL L.
REV. 369, 370, 373, 375-76, 402 (2006).
45. See generally 29 C.F.R. §§ 18.101-.1104 (2006) ("These rules govern formal
adversarial adjudications of the United States Department of Labor conducted before a
presiding officer.").
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With this view, this Article is divided into five parts. Following this
introduction, Part II provides a theoretical background of the
development of the administrative process and the adoption of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 46 and its relations with the
procedural provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act.4' Part III
demonstrates the challenges of evidentiary matters involved in
deportation proceedings and identifies some important shortcomings
needing remedial action. Part IV offers a brief analysis of selected
evidentiary rules in light of the DOL approach, and shows the benefits of
adopting similar provisions for deportation proceedings.
Part V
concludes that implementing such rules would restore integrity to the
immigration law system.
II. ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES: MANDATE & RULES OF PROCEDURE
AND EVIDENCE

This Part provides a brief overview of the theoretical underpinnings of
the creation of administrative agencies in the context of the
constitutional separation of powers, and outlines the rationale behind the
emergence of a bifurcated system of adjudication of controversies-i.e.,
the regular judicial process and the administrative process. It also offers
a brief description of the background and distinct features of the rules of
procedure and evidence applicable in administrative proceedings.
A. Delegation of Authority to Administrative Agencies
The polity of the United States is said to have been founded on the
fundamental principles of "limited government, negative freedom, and
laissez-faire economics."4'
Under this theoretical framework,
government power was not considered a means of solving society's
problems. The underlying assumption was that government interference
46. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
47. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537 (2000) [hereinafter INA].
48. CANN, supra note 1, at 9. Limited government implies that the government's
powers must be formally restricted through a constitution with all the guarantees for
fundamental freedoms enshrined in the Bill of Rights. See id. The essence of negative
freedom suggests the right to be free of government interference. Id. Laissez-faire
economics, as articulated by Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations in 1776, suggests that
the free market should determine the economy without government interference. Id. at 910. Laissez-faire, is however, not a concept that could easily be defined. The complexities
are outlined in a number of scholarly writings. See, e.g., Michael Les Benedict, LaissezFaire and Liberty: A Re-Evaluation of the Meaning and Origins of Laissez-Faire
Constitutionalism, 3 LAW & HIST. REV. 293, 293, 297-98 (1985); Calvin Woodward, Reality
and Social Reform: The Transition From Laissez-Faire to the Welfare State, 72 YALE. L. J.
286, 289-93 & n.9, 300-06, 323 (1962).
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with individual initiatives is counterproductive and thus the government
should refrain from any interference and limit its power to the protection
of life, liberty, and property of the individual

49

Increasingly, however,

strict adherence to this theoretical framework failed to solve society's
problems and became a subject of great controversy.50 The challenges to
this limited government framework took different forms, such as
demands for voting rights for women, child labor regulations, service
payment rates regulations (including railway grain elevator rates), labor
condition regulations, and antitrust regulations." Labor and socialist
movements around the world also contributed to the advancement of the
notion that government involvement could play a positive role in daily
life after all.52
Yielding to such increasing demands, the federal government started
enacting laws regulating some industries. Foremost among these early
actions were the enactment of the antitrust legislation and child labor3
laws, and the establishment of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).
These laws were, however, struck down by the Supreme Court as
unconstitutional 4 Gradually, economic theories that acknowledged the

49.

See CANN, supra note 1, at 9.

50. Id. at 9-10.
51. Id.
52. See, e.g., id. at 10. For example, in the 1880s, Germany adopted a system of
national health care and social security. After about twenty years the British followed the
German example. Id. at 11.
53. Id. at 10.
54. Id. The Supreme Court's involvement in this era was significant. Louis B.
Boudin, for example, said that the courts embarked on "a 'great revolution in our political
institutions"' by exercising the power to review laws designed to protect the interests of
business at the expense of the people. See David M. Gold, The Tradition of Substantive
Judicial Review: A Case Study of Continuity in Constitutional Jurisprudence, 52 ME. L.
REV. 355, 356 (2000) (quoting Louis B. Boudin, Government by Judiciary, 26 POL. SC. Q.
238, 270 (1911)). Arthur T. Hadley argued that the Court's interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment gave corporations "'powers and privileges' . .. beyond popular
control." Id. at 356-57 (quoting CHARLES GROVE HAINES, THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE
OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 340 (2d ed. 1932)). Another commentator suggested that the
corporations had "'practically appropriated' the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 357
(quoting CHARLES WALLACE COLLINS, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE
STATES 137-38 (1912)). On the opposite spectrum, Professor James Ely suggested that the
Court was
genuinely devoted to the preservation of individual liberty in a changing society.
Unlike modern liberals, the Fuller Court defined freedom largely in economic
terms and highly valued individual choice in economic matters .... [Tihe Fuller
Court strengthened private property as a primary personal right immune from
government tampering. A preoccupation with economic liberty had more to do
with the course of the Fuller Court than any hidden desire to safeguard the
interests of business per se.
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government's positive role in the economy gained some momentum.5
Although both the theory of negative freedom and the theory of
"positive government" play a significant role in politics, the steady
increase in government activity in every walk of life has persisted. 56
Administrative agencies and regulations go as far back as the beginning
of the United States itself in some rudimentary way.57 However,
increasing government involvement over the ages brought about
increasing administrative regulations and thus the growth of
administrative law.58
JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF MELVILLE W. FULLER, 1888-1910, at 7980 (1995). Perhaps the most significant of all the decisions of this era is Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). In Lochner, the Court struck down a New York law prohibiting
bakery work for more than 60 hours a week on grounds of violation of due process under
the Fourteenth Amendment. More specifically, the Court held: "The general right to
make a contract in relation to his business is part of the liberty of the individual protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution." Id. at 53; see also United
States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1895) (holding that Congress's Commerce
Clause power does not extend to the regulation of manufacturing monopolies under the
Sherman Act, which threatened one company's monopoly of 98% of the country's sugar
refining capacity); Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 526 (1898) (striking down a Nebraska law
establishing a minimum railway fare for interest travel as a violation of the railroad
owner's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process, as it deprived the railroad of its
property).
55. See CANN, supra note 1, at 9-10. Prominent among the various theories is the
Keynesian economic theory. It essentially suggests that "[m]arkets are far from perfectly
competitive, and their operation results in a persistent shortfall in 'effective demand' for
consumption, employment, and investment. The result is an endemic underutilization of
resources that can be at least partially corrected by government action." Robert Ashford,
Socioeconomics and Professional Responsibilities in Teaching Law-Related Economic
Issues, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 133, 154 (2004); see also Nancy C. Staudt, Constitutional
Politics and Balanced Budgets, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 1105, 1171 n. 342 (citing Martin
Feldstein, The Retreat from Keynesian Economics, 64 PUB. INT. 92, 93 (1981) (quoting
President Nixon as saying, "We are all Keynesians")). See generally, Abba P. Lerner,
Keynesianism: Alive, If Not So Well, at Forty, in FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY IN
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 59 (James M. Buchanan & Richard E. Wagner eds.,
1978).
56. See CANN, supra note 1, at 10. Professor Cann suggests that "[ijndeed these two
philosophies form the underpinnings of the two major political parties in America today."
Id.
57. See William H. Kuehnle, Standards of Evidence in Administrative Proceedings,49
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 829, 836 (2005). For example, a 1941 report by the Attorney
General's Committee on Administrative Procedure identifies administrative-type laws
enacted by the First Congress of the United States, primarily related to the collections of
customs and veteran benefits. Id. (citing S. DOC. NO. 77-8 (1941)). By 1941, about 51
administrates agencies were in existence. Id. Eleven of them, including the Internal
Revenue Bureau and the Patent Office, existed before the Civil War. Six more were
created between 1865 and the turn of the twentieth century, including the Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS), now called the United States Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS), and the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). Id.
58. See id. at 836-37.
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B. Rules of Procedureand Evidence in Agency Proceedings
The administrative system is meant to perform the government's
increasingly complex responsibilities in a simpler and more expedient
manner than the formal legislative and judicial processes.59 Apparently,
to attain the goal of expedited and swift adjudication of administrative
matters, the United States Supreme Court began relaxing the rules
governing the admissibility of evidence in administrative agency
proceedings as early as 1904. 6° In Interstate Commerce Commission v.
Baird, the Court ruled that formal and narrow rules of trials at common
law must not hamper the decision making process of administrative
agencies, particularly of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC).6
The Court distinguished such administrative claims from claims
at common law, which
require "strict correspondence . . . between
62
allegation and proof.,
The debate over the rules of evidence regulating administrative agency
proceedings is also as old as the delegation of adjudicatory authority to
the administrative agencies. 63 In fact, there was immense resistance to
the informalities of administrative proceedings from the very beginning.
For example, the American Bar Association, in a series of reports from
1934-1938 opposed delegation of adjudicatory authority to administrative
agencies, and advocated the establishment of an administrative court.6
The 1934 report went as far as saying: "'The judicial branch of the federal
government is being rapidly and seriously undermined ....
[S]o far as
possible, the decision of controversies of a judicial character must be
brought back into the judicial system.' 65 Since that had already become
almost impossible to do for many reasons (including constitutional
issues), the effort instead shifted to attempting to import court-like rules
to administrative agency proceedings.6

59. See id. at 831. Jeremy Bentham suggested that formal rules of admissibility of
evidence defy common sense because they exclude information that is helpful in reaching
a conclusion. Id. (citing JERMEMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 6
(Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1995) (1827)). The relaxation of the rules of evidence follow the
same common sense observation. See id.
60. See, e.g., Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Baird, 194 U.S. 25, 44-47 (1904).
61. Id. at 44.
62. Id.
63. See Graham, supra note 8, at 354.
64.

1

RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 1.4,

at 12-13 (4th

ed. 2002).
65. Id. § 1.4, at 12 (quoting 59 A.B.A.R. 539, 540 (1934)).
66. See Kuehnle, supra note 57, at 843-44 ("The effort later turned from bringing
administrative proceedings into a federal court system to bringing court standards into
administrative proceedings."); see also PIERCE, supra note 64, §1.4, at 13-15 (explaining
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In 1939, Congress passed legislation proposing that the Supreme Court
enact uniform rules for adversarial administrative trials, which would
of procedure and evidence
have, by and large, duplicated the rules
17
applicable in federal court proceedings. It never became law because
President Roosevelt vetoed it.68 On that occasion, he remarked:
[Il]t is impossible to subject the daily routine of fact finding in
many of our agencies to court procedure. Litigation has
become costly beyond the ability of the average person to bear.
Its technical rules of procedure are often traps for the unwary
and technical rules of evidence often prevent common-sense
determinations on information which would be regarded as
adequate for any business decision....
The administrative tribunal or agency has been evolved in
order to handle controversies arising under particular statutes.
It is characteristic of these tribunals that simple and
nontechnical hearings take the place of court trials and informal
proceedings supersede rigid and formal pleadings and
processes. A common-sense resort to usual and practical
sources of information takes the place of archaic and technical
application of rules of evidence, and an informed and expert
tribunal renders its decisions with an eye that looks forward to
results rather than backward to precedent and to the leading
69

case.
After remaining a70 source of immense controversy since the Supreme
Court's 1904 ruling, evidentiary rules in agency proceedings took their

that President Roosevelt directed the Attorney General to appoint a committee to
investigate "'the need for procedural reform in the field of administrative law"').
67. Identical bills introduced in 1939 (S. 915 and H.R. 4236) were enacted into law,
but vetoed by President Roosevelt. Kuehnle, supra note 57, at 844-45.
68. Id. at 845.
69. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Providing for the Expeditious Settlement of
Disputes with the United States, H.R. DOc. No. 76-986, at 1-2 (1940), quoted in Kuehnle,
supra note 57, at 845.
70. See e.g., Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229-30 (1938) ("The statute
[at issue] provides that 'the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall
not be controlling.' The obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to free
administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that the mere admission
of matter which would be deemed incompetent in judicial proceedings would not
invalidate the administrative order."); Spiller v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 253
U.S. 117, 130-31 (1920) (holding that hearsay may be admitted in administrative
proceedings when it is corroborated and introduced without objection at the trial level);
Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 227 U.S. 88, 93 (1913)
(holding that an administrative body is not constrained by strict judicial rules of evidence,
but that even the relaxed rules require basic guarantees such as the right to confrontation)
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current formal shape through the adoption of the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) in 1946. 7'
The APA was in essence a compromise between the advocacy for the
application of strict judicial type rules of procedure and evidence on the
one hand, and the advocacy for more relaxed and informal rules on the
other. One of the most important provisions of the APA that shows this
compromise states:
Any oral or documentary evidence may be received, but the
agency as a matter of policy shall provide for the exclusion of
irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious evidence. A
sanction may not be imposed or rule or order issued except on
consideration of the whole record or those parts thereof cited
by a party and supported by and in accordance with the reliable,
probative, and substantial evidence. 72
According to the APA, therefore, evidence that would otherwise be
inadmissible in federal courts, including hearsay, is admissible in
proceedings before federal administrative agencies even when the
proceedings are adversarial in nature. 73 Administrative agencies are not
only allowed to admit hearsay and other inadmissible evidence, but are
required to admit and consider such evidence.74 In essence, they have to
consider everything for what it is worth excluding only worthless and
redundant evidence.
There are several reasons for this fundamental deviation from the rules
of evidence applicable in judicial proceedings.
One underlying
assumption is that formal rules of evidence are designed to assist lay
persons making up juries in their determination of facts, which experts
adjudicating administrative matters do not to require." Moreover, broad
admissibility rules were deemed to be economically desirable,
particularly when large economic matters are involved. A very good
example of this 7 proposition
is found in Spiller v. Atchison, Topeka &
6
Santa Fe Ry. Co.
In Spiller, a group of shippers brought an action before the ICC
seeking reparations for alleged overcharge by railroads. 7 At the hearing,
71. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.). The enactment of the APA marked the
formal legislative beginning of a bifurcated system of admissibility of evidence in court
and in agency proceedings. See Kuehnle, supra note 57, at 846-48.
72. Administrative Procedure Act § 7(c), 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (2000).
73. See id.; see, e.g., Nat'l Assoc'n of Recycling Indus. v. Fed. Maritime Comm'n, 658
F. 2d 816, 825 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
74. See, e.g., id. at 824-25.
75. 2 PIERCE, supra note 64, at § 10.1.
76. 253 U.S. 117 (1920).
77. Id. at 122.
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the petitioners presented only one witness who based his testimony on
his examination of voluminous records of cattle shippers and commission
merchants.7' The ICC ruled in favor of the petitioners based essentially
on that testimony. 9 Following a series of appeals on evidentiary
grounds, the Supreme Court rested the case by holding that hearsay
evidence is admissible in administrative proceedings, especially when it is
corroborated. 80
In this case, if the hearsay testimony were excluded, the ICC would
have been required to make a determination based on the examination
of the voluminous documentation." Evidently, economic expediency
played a major role in this determination. Such considerations remain at
the center of the relaxation of evidentiary rules. Spiller also suggests that
relaxation of the rules is favored in complex economic cases where strict
rules would be economically burdensome.82 The dilemma is, however,
that relaxed rules tend to favor one or the other party depending on the
circumstances. In Spiller, for instance, stricter rules of the judicial
process would have certainly favored the Railroads' defense against
claims of overcharging.
Proponents of relaxed procedural and evidentiary rules of
administrative proceedings argue that the application of strict rules of
evidence, particularly the exclusion of hearsay, would disrupt the
administrative process of efficient and expeditious resolution of
disputes.83 Proponents of stricter rules, on the other hand, argue that the
proper regulation of admissibility of evidence brings order to the
administrative process and protects individual claimants from
indiscretions of powerful agencies. 4 Professor Glicksman, for example,
78. Id. at 129-30.
79. Id. at 130.
80. Id. at 131.
81. See id. at 125-26, 129.
82. See id. at 122-27.
83. See generally Kenneth Culp Davis, Hearsay in Administrative Hearings,32 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 689 (1964) (providing that "the distinction between hearsay and nonhearsay is more harmful than it is helpful in the federal administrative process, and that it
ought to be obliterated from the law, from the practice, and from the thinking"); Ernest
Gellhorn, Rules of Evidence and Official Notice in FormalAdministrative Hearings, 1971
DUKE L. J.1 ("Pressure to abandon, or at least to limit, the application of technical
common law rules of evidence has been directed toward administrative agencies from
many quarters.").
84. See generally Elliot B. Glicksman, The Modern Hearsay Rule Should Find
Administrative Law Application, 78 NEB. L. REV. 135 (1999) ("The need for judicial rules
of evidence, more particularly the application of the hearsay rule, is more urgent in
administrative proceedings than it is under general jurisdiction settings."); Joseph J.
Migas, Admissibility of Hearsay in Administrative Deportation Hearings: A Due Process
Call for Reform, 11 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 601 (1997) ("I will argue that the existing system
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argues that the suggestion that exclusion of hearsay evidence would
hamper the finding of the truth is fundamentally flawed because it
assumes the only purpose of the American trial is the finding of the
truth.8 He goes on, stating that more than just finding of the truth is
involved: "It is a widely accepted principle of Anglo-American law that
not all relevant evidence is admissible. Given that the American trial
system is designed to promote both truth and justice, evidentiary rules
' 6
that exclude potentially relevant evidence should not find rejection."
He further argues that because administrative adjudications today are
essentially the same as federal and state nonjury trials, there is no
compelling reason to subject them to different evidentiary standards."
None of the propositions outlined above are without merit. The
central difficulty in the divergent positions is the unified treatment of all
judicial proceedings on the one hand, and all adversarial administrative
proceedings on the other. Given the enormous diversity in the purposes
and functions of administrative agencies, and in the nature of interests
represented in their adjudications, approaching each administrative
agency individually, or a group of similarly situated agencies collectively,
would better address the procedural and evidentiary challenges. The
following section addresses the peculiarities of immigration proceedings
and demonstrates the difficulties associated with the application of the
generous procedural and evidentiary rules of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA).

III. RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN IMMIGRATION
PROCEEDINGS: THE CHALLENGES OF GENEROUS ADMISSIBILITY AND
MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS OF DUE PROCESS
This Part puts the nature of immigration deportation proceedings in
context. It provides a detailed discussion of the various aspects of the
challenges associated with the rules of procedure and evidence applicable
in immigration deportation proceedings, and demonstrates the need for
reconsideration of both the fundamental approach as well as some
specific rules.

for admitting hearsay evidence in deportation proceedings is not consistent with
constitutional guarantees of due process."); James L. Rose, Hearsay in Administrative
Agency Adjudication, 6 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 459 (1992) ("My purpose here is to explain

why Administrative Law Judges (ALSs) should reject hearsay evidence in administrative
adjudications.").
85. Glicksman, supra note 84, at 137.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 139.
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A. DeportationProceedingsin Perspective:
Civil, Criminal,or Quasi-Criminal?
More than a century ago, in Fong Yue Ting v. United States, the88
Supreme Court held that deportation proceedings are civil proceedings.
In 1984, reaffirming its century old determination, the Court in INS v.
Lopez-Mendoza noted that immigration proceedings are civil

proceedings because they are essentially designed to determine an
immigrant's eligibility under the immigration laws to stay in the United
States rather than to punish the immigrant for any wrongdoing.89
Regardless of this longstanding rule, however, the similarities between
criminal prosecutions and adversarial deportation proceedings are
evident. Deportation itself not only increasingly looks like a criminal
punishment, but also the proceeding now shares some of the most
fundamental characteristics of a criminal proceeding.9 Today, some
criminal proceedings and convictions have more serious immigration

88. 149 U.S. 698, 728-29 (1893); see also Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 39 (1924) ("It is
well settled that deportation, while it may be burdensome and severe for the alien, is not a
punishment.").
89. See INS. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984).
90. See Terry Coonan, Dolphins Caught in Congressional Fishnets-Immigration
Law's New Aggravated Felons, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 589, 590 (1998); Teresa A. Miller,
Citizenship & Severity: Recent Immigration Reforms and the New Penology, 17 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 611, 612-13 (2003). Deportation was traditionally reserved for serious and
violent crimes. The trend has, however, changed drastically over the last two decades. A
comparison of the list of crimes rendering an alien deportable in the old rules with the list
in the current rules demonstrates the changing trend in immigration law relating to crimes.
Compare Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7342, 102 Stat. 4181, 446970 (1988) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2000 & Supp. IV 2005))
(defining "aggravated felony" to include crimes such as murder and "trafficking in any
firearms or destructive devices"), with Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, §
501(a), 104 Stat. 4978, 5048 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)) (adding new
offenses to the aggravated felony category, including money laundering and crimes of
violence), and Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994, Pub. L.
No. 103-416, § 222,108 Stat. 4305, 4320-22 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43))
(adding to the list further, including theft offenses and conspiracy), and Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 440, 110 Stat. 1214, 1277-78
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)) (expanding the list significantly by
including crimes such as document fraud and perjury or subornation of perjury), and
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 [hereinafter
IIRIRA], Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 321, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-627 to 628 (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)) (adding more offenses to the list, but most importantly
lowering the threshold term of imprisonment that satisfies the definition of aggravated
felony for some of the offenses such as theft from five years to one year regardless of
whether the sentence is actually imposed or suspended); see also Coonan, supra, at 592605 (providing commentary on the increasing criminalization of the immigration law);
Miller, supra, at 612-14 (same).
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consequences than they do criminal penalties. 9' For example, a lawful
permanent resident who pleads guilty to shoplifting and receives a
suspended sentence of one year may be deported as an aggravated
felon. 92 That person will not be eligible for asylum even if she faces
persecution in her home country.93
The immigration system is
91. See generally INA § 237, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1227(a)(2) (West 2005 & Supp. 2007)
(listing criminal offenses that result in deportation). A suspended sentence of one year or
more for some offenses would simply make a person an aggravated felon. That person
does not serve any time but may be deported even if she is a lawful permanent resident.
For a definition of aggravated felony, see id. § 101, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2000 & Supp.
IV 2005).
92. See id. § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) (mandating the deportation of those who have been
convicted of an aggravated felony); see also id. § 101(a)(43)(G) (defining the crime of theft
as an aggravated felony when the sentence is more than one year). "[T]he fact that [the]
sentence [may be] suspended is [considered to be] irrelevant." S-S-, 21 1. & N. Dec. 900,
902 (1997); see also Pichardo v. INS, 104 F.3d 756, 759 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that the
maximum term of an indeterminate sentence is considered the actual sentence for
purposes of defining an aggravated felony). The IIRIRA, which amended the INA,
provides that:
Any reference to a term of imprisonment or a sentence with respect to an offense
is deemed to include the period of incarceration or confinement ordered by a
court of law regardless of any suspension of the imposition or execution of that
imprisonment or sentence in whole or in part.
IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 322, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-628 to 629 (1996) (codified at
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(B)). Congress made it clear that the new definition of an
aggravated felony "clarifies that in cases where immigration consequences attach
depending upon the length of a term of sentence, any court-ordered sentence is considered
to be 'actually imposed' including where the court has suspended the imposition of the
sentence." 142 CONG. REC. H10,899 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1996) (Joint Explanatory
Statement of the Committee of Conference). That is perhaps the worst part of the
IIRIRA because plea bargains are often agreed to based on the fact that suspension of the
sentence is so attractive and makes it seem as if there is no penalty at all. Unwary
immigrants take such bargains routinely. The author of this Article had the opportunity to
examine records of an actual case that confirms this concern. The respondent pleaded
guilty to shoplifting a sweater on sale for $15 dollars at a Macy's store in Alexandria,
Virginia. She was given a suspended sentence of a year, which meant 365 days under
Virginia law. That qualified her as an aggravated felon under INA section 101(a)(43).
She was deported as a result. It does not appear that she was advised of the immigration
consequences of her plea during the agreement. Even if she was not so advised, she could
not have raised ineffective assistance counsel as a defense in most jurisdictions. See
United States v. Fry, 322 F.3d 1198, 1200 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Banda, 1 F.3d
354, 356 (5th Cir. 1993); Varela v. Kaiser, 976 F.2d 1357, 1358 (10th Cir. 1992); United
States v. Del Rosario, 902 F.2d 55, 58-59 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Santos v. Kolb, 880 F.2d 941,
945 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Yearwood, 863 F.2d 6, 7-8 (4th Cir. 1988); United
States v. Campbell, 778 F.2d 764, 769 (11th Cir. 1985). But see United States v. Couto, 311
F.3d 179, 187-88 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that affirmative misrepresentation regarding the
immigration consequences of a plea agreement is ground for an ineffective assistance
claim).
93. See INA § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2000). Certain statutory bars apply
in asylum cases. By far the most commonly applied bar is the aggravated felony bar.
Under the INA, persons convicted of "a particularly serious crime" are barred from
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The two

systems are so closely intertwined as to share some of the same sorts of
evidence. For example, immigration courts routinely look at and
interpret state and federal criminal statutes to determine an alien's
eligibility for some type of relief under the immigration laws.95 Ina case
that this author has supervised, an immigration court had to determine
whether a Pennsylvania statute defining the crime of possession of stolen
property qualified as a crime of moral turpitude for immigration
purposes." The immigration court also had to look into the Pennsylvania
sentencing statutes, guidelines, and case law to determine what is meant
by imposition of a sentence for purposes of INA section 101(a)(43) when
the respondent was intermediately sentenced to a minimum of six
months and a maximum of twenty-three months."
obtaining asylum from persecution. See id. A per se rule considers all persons convicted
of an aggravated felony to have been convicted of "a particularly serious crime" barring
them from asylum. See id. § 208(b)(2)(B)(i).
94. See Kelly Kaiser, A Lawyer's Guide: How to Avoid Pitfalls When Dealing with
Alien Clients, 86 KY. L.J. 1183, 1186 (1998).
95. Cf Gerald Seipp, Third Circuit's New Role as Activist Court on Immigration
Issues, 51 VILL. L. REV. 981, 994 (2006) ("The [INA] penalizes many categories of
criminal conduct, and, of course, there are thousands of different federal and state
criminal statutes, not to mention criminal statutes from foreign jurisdictions that also
penalize criminal conduct. It is often necessary for the courts to juxtapose the
immigration statute with the applicable criminal statute and then proceed to analyze the
actual findings by the court .. ").
96. Crimes of moral turpitude are a group of crimes that have some serious
immigration consequences more like aggravated felonies. Both terms are creations of the
immigration law, not of the criminal law, but they now make up a significant part of the
criminal justice system. "Crimes of moral turpitude" are not defined under the INA,
however, courts have consistently used the following definition: "'[A]n act of baseness,
vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellow men,
or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty
between man and man."' Ng Sui Wing v. United States, 46 F.2d 755, 756 (7th Cir. 1931)
(quoting In re Henry, 99 P. 1054, 1055 (Idaho 1909)); see also Coykendall v. Skrmetta, 22
F.2d 120, 120-21 (5th Cir. 1927); Planas v. Landon, 104 F. Supp. 384, 388 (S.D. Cal. 1952);
United States ex rel Manzella v. Zimmerman, 71 F. Supp. 534, 537 (E.D. Pa. 1947); United
States ex rel Ciarello v. Reimer, 32 F. Supp. 797, 798 (S.D.N.Y. 1940); United States v.
Carrollo, 30 F. Supp. 3, 6-7 (W.D. Mo. 1939). Based on this definition, courts have
interpreted crimes of moral turpitude to include conduct such as providing false
information on a student loan application, Kabongo v. INS, 837 F.2d 753, 754, 758 (6th Cir.
1988), or heterosexual sodomy, Velez-Lonzano v. INS, 463 F.2d 1305, 1307 (D.C. Cir.
1972). For a list of crimes that may or may not be considered crimes of moral turpitude,
see generally STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY

547-48 (4th ed. 2005).
97. In this case, our client, a lawful permanent resident for fifteen years, pled guilty to
possession of stolen property and was sentenced to a probation of a minimum of six
months and a maximum of twenty-three months under Pennsylvania law. See generally 42
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9756 (West 2007). Inexplicably, however, he served a term of
five months and was released from the state penitentiary. Thereafter, he was put in
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More than ten years after the enactment of the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), 8 the
interaction between the criminal justice system and the immigration
system has become a matter of common knowledge. Whenever an
immigrant is subjected to the criminal justice system, the immigration
consequences often impact plea agreements and sentencing. At least one
circuit court of appeals has held that affirmative misrepresentation of the
immigration consequences of a guilty plea amounts to ineffective
assistance of counsel and warrants the withdrawal of the guilty plea. 9
By far, the most important category of offenses that have dramatic
immigration consequences are "aggravated felonies" 1

because they

immigration detention and the INS commenced deportation proceedings. The Service
alleged that he was not eligible for cancellation of removal under INA section 240 because
he had committed an aggravated felony within the meaning of INA section 101(a)(43),
which makes a theft for which the prison sentence is at least one year an aggravated
felony. See INA § 101(a)(43)(G). The issue was whether, under Pennsylvania law, the
maximum possible penalty is deemed to have been imposed when the defendant was
under the impression that he was getting a probation of twenty-three months at the
maximum. Examination of the Pennsylvania criminal statutes and of national case law
relating to criminal and sentencing statutes was the only way that the immigration judge
could determine the outcome. The examination revealed that in many jurisdictions,
including Pennsylvania, the maximum penalty is considered the penalty actually imposed
in the case of an indeterminate sentence, as long as it is an actual sentence and not
probation. See, e.g., Pichardo v. INS, 104 F.3d 756, 759 (5th Cir. 1997) ("For the purposes
of exclusion and deportation proceedings, an indeterminate sentence is to be considered a
sentence for the maximum term imposed."); Nguyen v. INS, 53 F.3d 310, 311 (10th Cir.
1995) ("[T]he legal effect [for purposes of INA section 101(a)(43)] of [an] indeterminate
sentence of three to eight years [is] the maximum term imposed, eight years."). Cf.
Rogers v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 724 A.2d 319, 321 n.2 (Pa. 1999) (discussing when
parole is available to a prisoner, the court notes "if the [parole] Board denies the
prisoner's application, the period of confinement can be the maximum period of
incarceration specified by the sentencing court").
98. IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
99. United States v. Couto, 311 F.3d 179, 187-88 (2d Cir. 2002) (defendant must also
prove he would not have pleaded guilty without the misrepresentation).
100. Although the term "aggravated felony" appears to be a criminal law concept, it is
essentially an immigration law term of art, though the criminal justice system is now
familiar with this strange class of offenses. Congress introduced the concept of aggravated
felony for the first time in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7342,
102 Stat. 4181, 4469-70 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2000 & Supp. IV
2005). The concept was then limited to serious crimes such as murder, and drug, firearm,
and explosives trafficking. Id. See generally Coonan, supra note 90 (examining "the scope
and evolution of the aggravated felon provisions"); see also Miller, supra note 90, at 632
(arguing that a culture of crime control has dominated efforts in the immigration arena).
For the current definition and list of offenses that qualify as aggravated felonies see INA §
101(a)(43). "Any alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after
admission is deportable." INA § 237, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (West 2005 & Supp.
2007).
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exclude a non-citizen from virtually all types of relief, with few
exceptions."° Immigration practitioners commonly say a conviction for
an aggravated felony is "the kiss of death to the noncitizen."' '° The
statutory scheme for determining what constitutes an aggravated felony
is very difficult.
Except in clear and serious cases, the most common way of
determining whether a given respondent is ineligible for cancellation of
removal or political asylum by reason of being convicted of an
aggravated felony involves examination of state and federal criminal
statutes. For example, one of the offenses that is considered an
aggravated felony under the INA is: "illicit trafficking in a controlled
substance . . . including a drug trafficking crime." 10 3

Under this

definition, when the conviction is for a drug trafficking offense in either
state or federal court, it would clearly be an aggravated felony for
purposes of the immigration proceeding. If, however, the respondent is
convicted of a non-trafficking offense in state court, the immigration
court needs to make a closer examination of not only the immigration
laws, but also of criminal statutes and criminal records.'9 Immigration
courts often look at the analogous federal statute to determine if the
offense could have qualified for federal prosecution had the respondent
been subject to federal jurisdiction.' 5 Complicated questions usually
101. See INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii). Aggravated felons are even excluded from applying
for asylum. See id. § 208, 8 U.S.C § 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2000). As indicated above, that is
because Congress made a per se rule of considering all aggravated felonies as "particularly
serious crimes" within the meaning of the statute. See id. § 208(b)(2)(B)(i) (requiring an
actual conviction). For a detailed discussion of what constitutes a conviction, see DAN
KESSELBRENNER & LORY D. ROSENBERG, IMMIGRATION LAW AND CRIMES § 2.17
(2007). Perhaps the only form of relief available for a non-citizen convicted of an
aggravated felony is deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).
See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, Annex art. 3, $ 1, U.N. Doc. AIRES/39/46 (Dec. 10, 1988)
[hereinafter Convention Against Torture]; see also Foreign Affairs Reform and
Restructuring Act of 1998, P.L. 105-277, § 2242, 112 Stat 2681-761, 2681-822 to 823 ("It
shall be the policy of the United States not to expel, extradite, or otherwise effect the
involuntary return of any person to a country in which there are substantial grounds for
believing the person would be in danger of being subjected to torture, regardless of
whether the person is physically present in the United States."). CAT relief is difficult to
obtain because the respondent must demonstrate that it is more likely than not that he/she
will be tortured by a government or its agents or at least by the acquiescence of the
government. Convention Against Torture, supra, art. 3.
102. See Ilana Etkin Greenstein, Into the Rabbit's Hole: When a Misdemeanor is a
Felony The Davis/Barrett Hypothetical Federal Felony Analysis of Drug Crimes, in
IMMIGRATION & NATIONALITY LAW HANDBOOK 137, 137 (Stephanie L. Browning et al.

eds., 2006).
103. INA § 101(a)(43)(B).
104. See Greenstein, supranote 102, at 137, 142.
105. Id.
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arise when dealing with criminal offenses such as this. It is difficult to
determine if offenses classified as misdemeanors under state law could be
considered aggravated felonies under the federal immigration statute.106
Immigration courts are called upon to make these kinds of
determinations almost on a daily basis.
Furthermore, immigration courts now consider some of the same
evidence presented for criminal proceedings. For example, in a case
where the criminal statute has two or more phases, and a conviction
under one phase qualifies as a crime of moral turpitude or an aggravated
felony but a conviction under the other does not-and when it is not
clear under which one of the two phases the defendant is convicted-the
court may look at the specifics of the criminal conduct, including the
charges.'07 Although complicated, this is increasingly becoming necessary
as the criminal justice and immigration enforcement systems become so
closely associated.
There are more reasons to consider deportation proceedings as
criminal proceedings rather than as civil proceedings. Immigration
deportation proceedings invariably involve the liberty interest of the
individual just like criminal proceedings. The final result inevitably
involves imprisonment and forced transportation of the individual from a
place where he wants to be to a place where he does not want to be. As
far back as 1922 Justice Brandeis said deportation takes a person from

106. The reverse also raises difficult issues-what if an offense is considered a felony
under state law but could only be prosecuted as a misdemeanor under federal law? There
is no clear answer for all of these questions, but immigration judges need to make such
determinations on a daily basis. Greenstein says:
The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) and the nation's circuit courts of
appeals have taken a deep dive into Alice's rabbit hole, and have convoluted,
circuitous paths to answering those questions. The result is a body of case law
with more twists and turns than the average roller coaster and with truly bizarre
results.
Id. at 137.
107. Cf Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 577, 602 (1990). In Taylor, the
defendant was convicted of burglary in Missouri. The Court had to decide whether the
defendant was a "violent felon" for purposes of sentence enhancement. See id. at 578-80.
The Missouri criminal statute pertaining to burglary provided for multiple types of
burglary, some of which qualified as crimes of violence, but others that did not. See id. at
578 n.1. In such circumstances, the Court held, a court may look at charging documents,
jury instructions, and the actual records to determine "all the elements of [the crime] in
order to convict the defendant." Id. at 602; see also United States v. Landeros-Gonzales,
262 F.3d 424, 425-26 (5th Cir. 2001) (concluding that where sentence enhancement
requires that the defendant have committed an aggravated felony, "the inherent nature of
the offense" determines whether the requisite elements of the crime have been met);
United States v. Doe, 960 F.2d. 221, 224 (1st Cir. 1992) ("[W]here a single statutory
provision defines several different crimes ... a court may have to look at the indictment
...to see which of the several different statutory crimes... was at issue.").
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"all that makes life worth living."'' 8 In fact, it was historically considered
a criminal punishment. In Seventeenth Century England, deportation
was a judicially sanctioned penalty. 1 Scholars suggest that deportation,
sometimes called banishment, was deemed an attractive form of criminal
penalty for serious offenses because it essentially accomplished what the
death penalty was designed to accomplish, albeit in a merciful manner.11
According to one commentator, "[e]xecution is a simple punishment,
quick, effective, economical, but not merciful. Hence perhaps the resort
to what seemed to many to be the next best thing-banishment." 1.
The similarities between immigration deportation proceedings and
criminal proceedings are not limited to the involvement of liberty
interests and the physical restraint and removal of the individual. The
actual proceedings are also quite similar.11 2 The government is
represented by an attorney and the proceedings are quite adversarial.
The respondent, just like a criminal defendant, is often detained and
appears in a court room with a prison uniform guarded by a police officer
at all times. The respondent answers charges filed against him by
attorneys representing the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)."3
If the respondent is unsuccessful in defending against the charges, he is
sent back to wherever it is believed that he came from. The actual
deportation involves the physical custody of the deportee before
deportation, and the forced physical removal of the individual, often in
handcuffs or other forms of body chains.11 4 For anyone observing these
proceedings and following the consequences thereof, there is nothing
civil about them. For all intents and purposes, they are the functional
equivalent of criminal proceedings without the constitutional guarantees
108. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922).
109. See Javier Bleichmar, Deportation as Punishment: A Historical Analysis of the
British Practice of Banishment and Its Impact on Modern Constitutional Law, 14 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 115, 120-22 (1999).
110. See id. at 123; see also Wm.Garth Snider, Banishment: The History of Its Use and
a Proposalfor Its Abolition Under the FirstAmendment, 24 NEW. ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 455, 462 (1998) (suggesting that the act was designed to remove criminals
from the English society).
111. See A.G.L. SHAW, CONVICTS AND THE COLONIES 21 (Humanities Press 1966);
see also WILFRID OLDHAM, BRITAIN'S CONVICTS TO THE COLONIES 11-12 (1990).
112. AM. BAR ASS'N, THE QUEST TO FULFILL OUR NATION'S PROMISE OF LIBERTY
AND JUSTICE FOR ALL 5 (2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/intlaw/policy/

humanrights/immigration2.06107A.pdf.
113. See id.
114. For example, in 2002, sixty-three Philippines citizens were deported from the
United States and arrived at the Manila airport in shackles. Reports indicate that the
body chains were kept on them for the entire 16-hour flight. See Michelle Rae Pinzon,
Was the Supreme Court Right? A Closer Look at the True Nature of Removal Proceedings
in the 21st Century, 16 N.Y. INT'L L. REv. 29, 32 n.20 (2003).
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applicable in criminal proceedings. 1' 5 The following sections discuss the
procedural and evidentiary rules that apply in deportation proceedings
and demonstrate the shortcomings of these rules in protecting the
legitimate liberty interests of the respondents in these proceedings.
These sections also demonstrate the infirmities of the rules that result in
serious jeopardy to the liberty interests of many and in significant
inconsistency and unpredictability.
B. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) Rules of
Procedureand Evidence
Neither the common law rules of evidence nor the codified Federal
Rules of Evidence (FRE) govern the admissibility of evidence in
immigration deportation proceedings."6 Immigration proceedings are
exclusively governed by the INA and the regulations issued in pursuance
of it.117 Although these rules are somewhat similar to the rules of the
APA, the APA rules are also inapplicable in immigration proceedings." 8
In 1950, about four years after the enactment of the APA and two
years before the enactment of the INA, in Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath,
the Supreme Court held that the APA applied to immigration
1 9 Five
proceedings.
years later, however, in Marcello v. Bonds, the Court
revisited its position and held that by adopting the 1952 Immigration
115. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 740-41 (1893) (Brewer, J.,
dissenting) ("[I]t needs no citation of authorities to support the proposition that
deportation is punishment. Every one knows that to be forcibly taken away from home,
and family, and friends, and business, and property, and sent across the ocean to a distant
land, is punishment, and that oftentimes most severe and cruel ....'[I]f
a banishment of
this sort be not a punishment, and among the severest of punishments, it will be difficult to
imagine a doom to which the name can be applied."' (quoting 4 THE DEBATES IN THE
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS
RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1778, at 555

(Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1881) (quoting President
Madison))).
116. See INA § 240, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(3) (2000) ("Unless otherwise specified in this
chapter, a proceeding under this section shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for
determining whether an alien may be admitted to the United States or... removed ....);
see, e.g., Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129, 133-34 (1991) (stating that the INA is the sole and
exclusive source of procedural rules-including rules of evidence-applicable in
deportation proceedings); see also Henry v. INS, 74 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1996); Felzcerek v.
INS, 75 F.3d 112, 116 (2d Cir. 1996); Villegas-Valenzuela v. INS, 103 F.3d 805, 812 (9th
Cir. 1996).
117. INA § 240(a)(3). See generally 8 C.F.R. pt. 240 (2007) (providing regulations
governing immigration proceedings issued pursuant to the INA).
118. Ardestani, 502 U.S. at 133-34.
119. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 51, 53 (1950), modified, 339 U.S. 908
(1950), superseded by statute, INA, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952), as recognized in
Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955).
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Nationality Act, Congress legislatively superseded Wong Yang Sung and
provided for special rules applicable in deportation proceedings."20 In
Ardestani v. INS, ten years after the enactment of the Immigration and
Nationality Act Amendments of 1981, the Court reaffirmed its Marcello
decision. 2 '
At issue in Ardestani was whether attorney's fees may be awarded
under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) 122 for a party who prevails
in deportation proceedings in an appeal by the government.'23 The APA
provides that "[a]n agency that conducts an adversary adjudication shall
award, to a prevailing party other than the United States, fees and other
expenses incurred by that party in connection with that proceeding."' 2 4
The EAJA defines adversarial adjudication as "an adjudication under
section 554 of [Title 5] in which the position of the United States is
represented by counsel."' 25 Section 554 of Title 5 in turn provides for the
scope of proceedings governed by the APA.
As there was no dispute
regarding the representation of the interest of the United States by
counsel, the only pertinent issue for the Court was "whether deportation
proceeding[s constituted] . .. adversarial adjudication "'under section
554"' [of the APA] within the meaning of the EAJA.' ' 127 Applying the
Marcello precedent, the Court held that "deportation proceeding[s are]
not subject to the APA."' 28
Although the Court's ruling in the Ardestani case is focused and
specific, it is generally considered to stand for the proposition that
deportation proceedings are not governed by the APA but exclusively by
the INA.
Ironically, however, many of the INA procedural and
evidentiary rules are based on the APA.129
In fact, the Court
acknowledged this in its Ardestani opinion when it said: "It is immaterial

120. Marcello, 349 U.S. at 309-10 ("[W]e cannot ignore the background of the 1952
immigration legislation, its laborious adaptation of the Administrative Procedure Act to
the deportation process, the specific points at which deviations from the Administrative
Procedure Act were made, the recognition in the legislative history of this adaptive
technique and of the particular deviations, and the direction in the statute that the
methods therein prescribed shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for deportation
proceedings.").
121. Ardestani, 502 U.S. at 133-34.
122. Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481, 94 Stat. 2325 (1980) (codified in
scattered sections of 5, 26, 28 & 41 U.S.C.).
123. Ardestani, 502 U.S. at 131.
124. 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) (2000).
125. Id. § 504(b)(1)(C)(i).
126. 5 U.S.C.A. § 554(a) (West Supp. 2007).
127. See Ardestani, 502 U.S. at 133.
128. Id. at 134.
129. See DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 91 (3d ed.
1999).
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that the Attorney General in 1983 promulgated regulations that conform
deportation hearings more closely to the procedures required for formal
adjudication under the APA."13
Ardestani simply carved out the
possibility of attorney's fees and other cost awards in immigration
proceedings."' However, Ardestani was given expanded meaning over
the years, resulting in a substantially higher degree of flexibility and less
procedural
guarantees in deportation proceedings governed solely by the
132
INA.

Consistent with Ardestani, lower courts continued the curtailment of
some fundamental guarantees that the APA offered individual claimants.
For example, in Kaczmarczyk v. INS, the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit held that because the APA is not applicable in
immigration deportation proceedings, the BIA is not required to afford
aliens a chance to rebut the Board's administrative notice of facts.
Therefore, it is safe to conclude that the INA rules of procedure and
evidence are more relaxed than even the APA rules. As this Article
contends, such informality has resulted in more inconsistency,
unpredictability, and at times, outright abuse.
The INA provides that "[u]nless otherwise specified in this chapter, a
proceeding under this section shall be the sole and exclusive procedure
for determining whether an alien may be admitted to the United States
or, if the alien has been so admitted, removed from the United States." 134
The Act assigns the immigration judge the role of an investigator. It
states: "The immigration judge shall administer oaths, receive evidence,
and interrogate,
examine and cross-examine the alien and any
, 135
witnesses.

130.

Ardestani, 502 U.S. at 134 (citing 48 Fed. Reg. 8038-8040 (1983)).

131. See id. at 131.
132. See generally Campos v. INS, 62 F.3d 311 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding that the "law is
clear"; immigration proceedings are not controlled by the APA); Hernandez-Avalos v.
INS, 50 F.3d 842 (10th Cir. 1995) (noting that "under the exclusivity provision of the
[INA]. ... the APA does not govern adjudicatory proceedings"); Howell v. INS, 72 F.3d
288 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that the APA is inapplicable to deportation proceedings).
133. Kaczmarczyk v. INS, 933 F.2d 588, 595 (7th Cir. 1991). But see Castillo-Villagra v.
INS, 972 F.2d 1017, 1028-29 (9th Cir. 1991) ([S]ome propositions . . . may require that
notice not be taken, or that warning be given, or that rebuttal evidence be allowed.").
134. INA § 240, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(3) (2000).
135. Id. § 240(b)(1). The judge's role in immigration proceedings is quite different
from judges of the judicial system in an adversarial system. It resembles, however, the role
of judges in the judicial systems of the civil law, which is essentially inquisitorial. For a
discussion of the differences in the adversarial and inquisitorial systems, and the
challenges of a mixed system, see generally MIRJAN R. DAMASKA, THE FACES OF
JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY (1986); Patrick L. Robinson, Rough Edges in the

Alignment of Legal Systems in the Proceedings at the ICTY, 3 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 1037
(2005).
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With respect to the alien's rights, the INA provides:
the alien shall have a reasonable opportunity to examine the
evidence against the alien, to present evidence on the alien's
own behalf, and to cross-examine witnesses presented by the
Government but these rights shall not entitle the alien to
examine such national security information as the Government
may proffer in opposition to the alien's admission to the United
States or to an aplication by the alien for discretionary relief
under this chapter.
Regulations issued pursuant to the INA provide that immigration
137
courts "shall receive and consider material and relevant evidence.,
Consistent with the APA, there are no restrictions as to the admissibility
of evidence other than materiality, relevancy, and redundancy. 38 The
extremely flexible evidentiary standards have obviously contributed to

the enormous inconsistency and unpredictability of immigration court
proceedings across the nation. Although courts have tried to impose
some constitutional restrictions on1.the
139 admissibility of some types of

evidence in deportation proceedings, the absence of a uniform and
coherent guidance in evidentiary issues is still causing some serious
problems.14° The constitutional limitations are discussed in pertinent
parts in the following subsections.
C. Flexible Standards and ConstitutionalLimits

Constitutional protection of aliens is a complex subject because the
level of protection essentially depends on the level of the ties that an
alien has with the polity of the United States.41 Aliens seeking admission
have significantly less protection than aliens in deportation proceedings

136. INA § 240(b)(4)(B).
137. See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.1(c) (2007).
138. See, e.g., ANKER, supra note 129, at 91 ("[T]he BIA effectively has adopted the
much broader approach of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which states that,
'Any oral or documentary evidence may be received, but the agency as a matter of policy

shall provide for the exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious evidence."'
(quoting Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1998))).
139. See, e.g., Cunanan v. INS, 856 F.2d 1373, 1375 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding hearsay
evidence relied on by the government denied the respondent of the opportunity to crossexamine a witness where the government failed to make reasonable efforts to present the
witness); see also Chavez-Raya v. INS, 519 F.2d 397, 401 (7th Cir. 1975); Barcenas, 19 I. &
N. Dec. 609, 611 (1988).
140. See Acello, supra note 41.
141. See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271-72 (1990) (holding
that the Fourth Amendment applies to aliens but that a "significant voluntary" attachment
to the United States is required).
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after having been duly admitted. 4 2 Constitutional principles of due
process, however, apply in almost all immigration cases.143 Nonetheless,
as indicated above, some of the basic protections of criminal proceedings
do not apply in immigration proceedings as they are considered civil
proceedings.'" This section will demonstrate the shortcomings of some
of the "flexible" procedural and evidentiary rules and argues that such
rules both undermine the constitutional protections that should
otherwise apply and contribute to the inconsistency and unpredictability
of immigration deportation proceedings in general.
1. Due Processin the Immigration Context

Constitutional due process is perhaps the most fundamental notion
that guides any adjudication involving liberty and property interests. As
such, it is the appropriate beginning of any inquiry relating to procedural
and evidentiary standards. As indicated above, the flexible evidentiary
standards under the INA allow the admissibility of all types of evidence
with little or no restriction. Perhaps the only meaningful test of
reasonableness is due process. A due process check is almost always
available.' 45 In Mathews v. Diaz, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the
142. Under the INA, a distinct set of criteria determines inadmissibility and
deportability. For grounds of inadmissibility, see generally INA § 212, 8 U.S.C.A. §
1182(a) (West 2005 & Supp. 2007). For grounds of deportability, see generally id. § 237, 8
U.S.C.A. § 1227(a) (West 2005 & Supp. 2007).
143. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976).
144. See Chavez-Raya, 519 F.2d at 400-01.
145. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265-66; Mathews, 426 U.S. at 77. Due process
in the immigration context takes a particularly elusive shape and, as such, is a subject of
serious controversy. Perhaps the proper starting point is the Supreme Court's decision in
the case commonly known as The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889). There, the
Court held that Congress has plenary power to regulate immigration, and that its laws are
immune from judicial review. Id. at 602-04, 609. More than a hundred years of
jurisprudence since this decision has complicated the matter. Although currently there is
no dispute that all non-citizens are entitled to some kind of due process, the level of due
process they get depends on the level of their contact with the United States. See, e.g.,
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265-66 (holding that the Fourth Amendment's application
extends to a more limited category of persons-those with substantial contacts with the
U.S.-than the Fifth and Sixth Amendments). See generally James G. Connell, III&
Rend L. Valladares, Search and Seizure Protections for Undocumented Aliens: The
Territorialityand Voluntary Presence Principlesin Fourth Amendment Law, 34 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 1293 (1997) ("Nowhere is the ebbing tide of constitutional rights accorded to
aliens more noticeable than in search and seizure law."); Victor C. Romero, The Domestic
Fourth Amendment Rights of Undocumented Immigrants: On Guitterez and the Tort
Law/Immigration Law Parallel, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 57 (2000) (arguing that
whenever Fourth Amendment issues arise, courts should place less emphasis on the
immigration status of the involved individual); Michael Scaperlanda, PartialMembership:
Aliens and the ConstitutionalCommunity, 81 IOWA L. REV. 707 (1996) ("[T]wo opposing
approaches-strict scrutiny and unbridled discretion-reflect the tenuous position
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fundamental notion that aliens are entitled to the constitutional
protection of due process.' 46 It stated:
There are literally millions of aliens within the jurisdiction of
the United States. The Fifth Amendment, as well as the
Fourteenth Amendment, protects every one of these persons
from deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law. Even one whose presence in this country is
transitory is entitled to that
unlawful, involuntary, 14or
7
constitutional protection.
The following subsections discuss specific INA provisions applicable in
deportation proceedings in light of constitutional due process principles,
and demonstrate the shortcomings of the corresponding procedural and
evidentiary rules.
(a) AdministrativeImpartiality:Immigration Judge as a Neutral
Adjudicator
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court held that due process
requires "a meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for
[deprivation of liberty] before a neutral decisionmaker. '1 48 Regarding
what constitutes procedural due process in general, the Supreme Court
stated: "consideration of what procedures due process may require under
any given set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the

For
occupied by noncitizens within the American constitutional community.").
commentary relating to the plenary power doctrine and consequences, see generally Louis
Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion
and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853 (1987), noting that "[t]he power to regulate
immigration is not among the enumerated powers of Congress," Hiroshi Motomura,
Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom ConstitutionalNorms and
Statutory Interpretation,100 YALE L.J. 545 (1990), explaining "the advent and persistence
of the plenary power doctrine as the dominant principle of constitutional and
subconstitutional immigration law," and Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of
Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1984), stating that "[t]he signs of incipient
changes are abundant and unmistakable," and "[tihe courts' almost complete deference to
Congress and the immigration authorities, long a keystone of the classical structure, is
beginning to give way to a new understanding and rhetoric of judicial role."
146. Mathews, 426 U.S. at 77-78.
147. Id. at 77 (citations omitted). A number of decisions rendered in the early and mid
1970s held that aliens in the territories of the United States are entitled to the protection
of the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 88486 (1975) (holding that a border-patrol stop solely based on the ethnic appearance of the
occupant of a vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment); Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973) (holding that border-patrol's warrantless search of a
vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment); see also Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 271.
148. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004).
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precise nature of the government function involved as well as
9 of the
private interest that has been affected by governmental action.',
Originally, immigration deportation proceedings were non-adversarial
in nature and were conducted by Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS or the Service) officials without the government being separately
represented by counsel.5 Later on, INS officials called "special inquiry
officers" were statutorily assigned to preside over immigration
hearings.' In 1956, the "special inquiry officers" were made to operate
independently of the INS.'52 Then, in 1973, their title was changed to
"Immigration Judge" and the authority to wear robes during hearings in
courtrooms was established. 53
In 1983, the Executive Office of
Immigration Review (EOIR) was created within the Department of
Justice. Immigration judges then became part of the EOIR, gaining
more independence.'9 The creation of the EOIR within the Justice
Department was mainly prompted
by concerns about the
appropriateness of "judges being paid by the same agency that prepared
and prosecuted the cases."' 55
Under the existing structure, while the EOIR remains a part of the
Department of Justice,'56 the new United States Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS) became part of DHS in March 2003."'
149. Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895
(1961); see also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970).
150. See Deborah E. Anker, Determining Asylum Claims in the United States: A Case
Study on the Implementation of Legal Norms in an UnstructuredAdjudicatorEnvironment,
19 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 433,488-89 (1992).
151. See id. at 489 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(4) (Supp. 1992)).
152. See id.; see also James P. Vandello, Perspective of an Immigration Judge, 80
DENV. U. L. REV. 770, 771 (2003).
153. Vandello, supra note 152, at 771; see also Anker, supra note 150, at 489.
154. See Anker, supra note 150, at 489; see also United States Department of Justice,
Executive
Office
for
Immigration
Review,
Background
Information,
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/background.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2007) [hereinafter EOIR
Background].
155. Vandello, supra note 152, at 771.
156. See EOIR Background, supra note 154. The EOIR was established on January 9,
1983 within the Department of Justice. It combined the BIA and the INS. Now, functions
previously performed by the INS are performed by the DHS. The creation of the EOIR
within the DOJ separated the enforcement functions of the immigration courts from the
enforcement functions of the INS. Id.
157. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, About USCIS, http://www.uscis.
gov/aboutus (last visited Nov. 11, 2007) [hereinafter USCIS, About Us]. In November
2002, President Bush signed the Homeland Security Act into law. Press Release, The
White House, President Bush Signs Homeland Security Act (Nov. 25, 2002), http://
www.whitehouse.govlnewslreleases/2002ll1/20021125-6.html.
The Act transferred the
functions of the former INS to the DHS. USCIS, About Us, supra. Immigration
enforcement functions were delegated to the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and
the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). See generally U.S. Customs and
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The Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) within the USCIS
currently performs duties formerly performed by the INS, including
investigation, intelligence, detention, removal, and eorcement. 118
Today, ICE is responsible for initiating deportation proceedings against
aliens and representing the government in deportation proceedings.'59
Immigration judges within the EOIR of the Department of Justice make
findings of fact and law in each case.' 6° An immigration judge's decision
6
maybe appealed to the BIA within the EOIR.1
' Decisions of the BIA
may be appealed to the circuit court of appeals with jurisdiction over the
matter. 62
Although the structure appears to be formal, immigration proceedings
are conducted in an extremely informal environment. Immigration
judges face unique responsibilities that are not common in any
administrative, civil, or criminal proceedings. Judge James P. Vandello,

Border Patrol Home Page, http://www.cbp.gov/; U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement Homepage, http://www.ice.gov/. Today, the USCIS has 15,000 federal
employees working in 250 headquarters and field officers around the world. USCIS,
About Us, supra.
158. See U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, ICE Operations,
http://www.ice.gov/about/operations.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2007) [hereinafter ICE
Operations].
159. See ICE Operations, supra note 158; U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, ICE Office of Detention and Removal, http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/
factsheets/dro10206.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2007).
160. See United States Department of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration
Review, EOIR Responsibilities, http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/responsibilities.htm (last visited
Nov. 11, 2007). EOIR is tasked with the duty of adjudicating immigration cases. Under a
delegation of authority by the Attorney General, the EOIR administers the nation's
immigration law.
Its functions include the interpretation of immigration laws,
adjudication of cases, and appellate review of decisions. It has three main components:
the Office of the Chief Immigration Judge, which manages the more than 200 judges
around the country, the Board of Immigration Appeals, which reviews decision of the
immigration courts, and the Office of the Chief Administrative Hearing Officer, which
handles employment related immigration cases. Id.; United States Department of Justice,
Executive Office for Immigration Review, Office of the Chief Immigration Judge,
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/ocijinfo.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2007).
161. See United States Department of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration
Review, Board of Immigration Appeals, http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/biainfo.htm (last
visited Nov. 11, 2007). The BIA has eleven members, hears appeals from immigration
courts and "is the highest administrative body for interpreting and applying immigration
laws." Id. It employs very deferential standards for the review of factual findings of
immigration courts-i.e., the factual determinations have to be "clearly erroneous" to be
overturned. See U.S. Department of Justice, Fact Sheet, Board of Immigration Appeals:
Final Rule, availableat http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/biafinalrule.pdf.
162. See U.S. Department of Justice, Fact Sheet, BIA Restructuring and Streamlining
Procedures (March 9, 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/press/06/BIAStream
liningFactSheet030906.htm.
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who served as an immigration judge for decades, summarized the
uniqueness of his responsibilities as follows:
My duties sometimes vary considerably from those of other
administrative judges and from civil and criminal court judges
....I have cases where there are hours of testimony concerning
torture in Algerian prisons. I listen to the testimony of medical
personnel who are torture experts. I have people appear in
front of me with no attorney, all-alone, and they do not speak
English. Not only that, they speak a rare language where there
are no interpreters available in this area, and only one or two in
the United States. I see cases such as that of a young man who
has been in the United States since he was six months old and is
now facing deportation to the Philippines, a country he knows
virtually nothing about. And there is absolutely no possibility
of his remaining in the United States. I have many cases where
the respondent has dealt with an "attorney" for many months
(and at a great cost), only to find out later that the person was a
notary public and not an attorney, and could not represent him
in court."'
This passage demonstrates that the duties of immigration judges are
indeed unique and challenging. The statutory guidance they have to
carryout these difficult responsibilities are not, however, without some
serious shortcomings. Not only are immigration judges required to make
findings of fact and law as neutral adjudicators, but they are also required
to act as examiners.
Particularly disconcerting is the requirement that
165
they cross-examine respondents who appear before them.
Under the
INA, evidentiary matters ought to be resolved in an evidentiary hearing
before an immigration judge.' 66 The INA also provides that "the
immigration judge shall administer oaths, receive evidence, and
1 67
interrogate, examine, and cross-examine the alien and any witnesses.
The role of immigration judges is thus not limited to performing the
duties of a neutral adjudicator, but it also includes performing duties as
an investigator and examiner. Consistent with this provision, in S-M-J-,
the BIA noted that "the duty to ascertain and evaluate all the relevant
facts is shared between the applicant and the examiner."'6 "Examiners"

163.
164.

See Vandello, supra note 152, at 770-71.
See INA § 240, 8 U.S.C. 1229a(a)(b)(1) (2000).

165. Id.
166. Cf.id. § 240(a)(1) ("An immigration judge shall conduct proceedings for deciding
the inadmissibility or deportability of an alien.").
167. Id. § 240(b)(1) (emphasis added).
168. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook on
Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status Under the 1951 Convention and
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includes immigration judges.169
. . .
. 170
role of a judge in administrative
Although an inquisitorial
proceedings is not uncommon, 71 the INA goes too far by involving an
197, U.N. Doc
the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,
HCR/IP/4/Eng[Rev.1 (reedited Jan. 1992) (1979), quoted in S-M-J-, 21 1. & N. Dec. 722,
729 (1997).
169. See id.
170. See generally DAMASKA, supra note 135 ("The adversarial mode of proceeding
takes its shape from a contest or a dispute: it unfolds as an engagement of two adversaries
before a relatively passive decision maker whose principal duty is to reach a verdict. The
nonadversarial mode is structured as an official inquiry. Under the first system, the two
adversaries take charge of most procedural action; under the second, officials perform
most activities."). Regarding the interface between the two systems in the international
context, see generally Robinson, supra note 135, which "focuses on four areas in which
there is tension between the two legal systems resulting from either the introduction of
measures or procedures from the civil law inquisitorial system into the essentially
adversarial regime for the collection and presentation of evidence, or the incorporation of
common-law procedures without full recognition of their interaction with predominantly
civil law features in certain areas of the Tribunal's legal system." The inquisitorial system
is prevalent in continental Europe, Latin America, and parts of Asia. In this system,
judges presiding over any proceedings are responsible for the introduction of evidence and
development of the record. See Joachim Herrmann, Models for the Reform of the
Criminal Trial in Eastern Europe: A Comparative Perspective, 1996 ST. LOUIS-WARSAW
TRANSATLANTIC L.J. 127, 128. The judge calls and examines witnesses, including the
accused in criminal trials. Id. Although the judge's role as an examiner is a common
feature of this system, the details vary from country to country. For example, in France,
the obligation of judges to discover the truth through their involvement is stated as "the
'honor and conscience' of the judge to find out the truth. See id. at 134 (quoting C. PR.
PEN. art. 310(1), reprinted in 29 AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES (Gerald
Kock & Richard Frase trans., 1988)). In Germany, the duty is stated as: "'the court shall,
upon its own motion, extend the taking of the evidence to all facts and evidence which are
important for the decision."' Id. (quoting StPO § 244(2), reprinted in 10 AMERICAN
SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES (H. Niebler trans., 1965)).

Many countries that

traditionally adhered to the inquisitorial system have increasingly adopted the AngloAmerican adversarial legal system. Examples include Japan, Sweden, and Italy. Id. at
137-38.
171. For example, the Social Security Administration adjudicates hundreds of
thousands of claims every year-"more cases than all the federal courts combined."
Milton M. Carrow, A Tortuous Road to BureaucraticFairness:Righting the Social Security
Disability Claims Process,46 ADMIN. L. REV. 297, 297-98 & n.3 (1994). An administrative
judge in these proceedings has the responsibility of developing the record by actively
engaging in examining witnesses and seeking more evidence. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.929,
.944 (2007). However, in social security proceedings, the judge is one of the only two
lawyers present during the hearing (assuming the claimant is represented) because the
government is not represented at all. See Jeffrey S. Wolfe & Lisa B. Proszek, Interaction
Dynamics in FederalAdministrative Decision Making: The Role of the InquisitorialJudge
and the Adversarial Lawyer, 33 TULSA L.J. 293, 295 (1997). The administrative judge's
active involvement, even in this situation, is a subject of criticism. Id. at 298 (noting that
courts have described the judge's involvement "as sort of judicial schizophrenia" because
they wear the "'dual hats' of investigator and adjudicator"). In fact, the adversarial nature
of the proceedings is minimized because the judge must fill in for the government's
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immigration judge in cross-examination, which is a typical feature of an
adversarial system. Cross-examination is traditionally a tool used by an
adversary to elicit information that is otherwise not helpful to the party
that is subjected to cross-examination. It is used for the purposes of
discrediting the witness and undermining testimony. '
In Davis v.
Alaska, the Supreme Court characterized the traditional role of crossexamination as follows:
Cross-examination is the principal means by which the
believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are
tested. Subject always to the broad discretion of a trial judge to
preclude repetitive and unduly harassing interrogation, the
cross-examiner is not only permitted to delve into the witness'
story to test the witness' perceptions and memory, but the crossexaminer has traditionally been allowed to impeach, i.e.,
discredit, the witness. .

.

. A more particular attack on the

witness' credibility is effected by means of cross-examination
directed toward revealing possible biases, prejudices, or ulterior
motives of the witness as they 1may
relate directly to issues or
73
personalities in the case at hand.
Professor Laurence Tribe also says that cross-examination is "thought
to expose any testimonial infirmities. '1 74 As such, it necessarily puts the
examiner and the examinee in opposite and adversarial positions. The
nature of such a relationship necessarily precludes the possibility of one
party to act neutrally towards the other and definitely puts them in
confrontational positions.
Judge Wolfe of the Social Security Office of Hearings and Appeals
asks the following questions relating to the role of the administrative law
judge in the social security context. The questions are equally pertinent
to the immigration judge.
How does the judge, trained and experienced in the adversarial
system of justice, perceive her active role? How does she
absence in the social security context. In the immigration context, however, the
proceedings are as adversarial as any proceeding could get because the government is
represented by an attorney. Even the Social Security Administration adjudication rules
do not expressly permit the judge to engage in cross-examination of claimants or
witnesses, although critics suggest that ordinary examination of witnesses might effectively
lead to cross-examination. Id. at 299 n.38.
172. Brenda Danet & Bryna Bogoch, Fixed Fight or Free-For-All?An EmpiricalStudy
of Combativeness in the Adversary System of Justice, 7 BRIT. J.L. & SOC'Y 36, 37 (1980)

("The purpose of cross-examination is to test the credibility of the other side's witnesses
and, if possible, to destroy or reveal inconsistencies and gaps in their testimony presented
during direct examination."), quoted in Wolfe & Proszek, supra note 171, at 303.
173. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974).
174.

See Laurence H. Tribe, TriangulatingHearsay,87 HARV. L. REV. 957, 962 (1974).
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maintain the requisite jurisprudential distance necessary to
independent decision making when required to respond to an
adversarial lawyer, unchecked by an opposing party? Is she
likely to perceive herself as requiredto engage in a role which is
somehow perceived as less independent than her adversarial
is, in an
colleague, as a means of ensuring fairness-that
17 5
attempt to balance the activity of the lawyer?
Professor Lasso writes: "The inquisitorial model places on judges the
potentially conflicting roles of fact finder and decisionmaker. This
burden unavoidably allows biases and prejudicial influences to unfairly
'
prejudice results."176
Nowhere is such a concern more pertinent than in

immigration proceedings. A party involved in such confrontation would
naturally have a different perspective and mind set than a party
independently observing what transpires between parties on the opposite
side of an argument. Cross-examination of respondents and witnesses is
indeed not a suitable task for a judge in an adversarial system.177
A very good example of what might result in adversarial relations
between a claimant and a judge is one New York immigration judge's
remark in an asylum case. Liu, a 39-year-old Chinese asylum seeker told
the judge that Chinese authorities forcibly sterilized her by "subject[ing]
her to painful uterine surgery" after she had her second child.178 After
175. See Wolfe & Proszek, supra note 171, at 346-47.
176. Rogelio A. Lasso, Gladiators Be Gone: The New Disclosure Rules Compel a
Reexamination of the Adversary Process, 36 B.C. L. REV. 479, 508 (1995) (footnote
omitted).
177. Even in the civil law inquisitorial system where the judge has a significantly more
inquisitorial role, judges may conduct questioning, but cross-examination is not common.
Judge Patrick Robinson of the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY),
writing in the context of the ICTY rules of evidence and procedure, which are essentially a
combination of the common law adversarial and civil law inquisitorial systems, suggests
that such a combination could lead to unfairness if not cautiously handled. See Robinson,
supra note 135, at 1043. He remarks "the essence of that party-driven process [common
law adversarial] is cross-examination." Id. He further states that "[it is unusual in such a
system to invest a Judge with the power to determine whether an accused should crossexamine a prosecution witness who has given evidence which may or may not strengthen
the prosecution case against him." Id. This suggests that giving a judge the discretion to
allow or disallow cross-examination is not appropriate. Engaging a judge in crossexamining a witness who appears before him would be an extremely drastic deviation
from the adversarial system and is not even encouraged in the civil law inquisitorial
system. Id. Federal courts have, at times, encouraged the active involvement of the
immigration judge, but mainly in situations where the respondent is not represented and
not able to present her case properly. See, e.g., Jacinto v. INS, 208 F.3d 725, 733-35 (9th
Cir. 2000). As another example, the Department of Labor Rules of Procedure allow the
Administrative Law Judge to examine the witness but do not expressly provide for crossexamination. See 29 C.F.R. § 18.29 (2007).
178. See Nina Bernstein, New York's Immigration Courts Lurch Under a Growing
Burden, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8,2006, at Al.
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some questioning, the judge remarked: "'You have been lying all day,
but if you admit to lying, I will grant your case.' ' . 7 9 The New York Times
reported that the asylum seeker said through an interpreter: "'I was very
angry, because everything I said was true."" 8 Her case was denied but
she appealed to the BIA and then to the Court of Appeals 8for the
'
Second Circuit, which remanded the case for further proceedings.1
The rules make this kind of confrontation possible. This is a significant
shortcoming of the INA rules of procedure and evidence. Revised rules
that would significantly curtail confrontations of this nature, avoid
any administrative or departmental bias, improve the nature of the
relationship between the judge and the respondent, and restore the
traditional role of the judge in adversarial proceedings need to be
seriously considered.
(b) Appearanceand Representation
Factual disputes involved in immigration matters are often resolved in
Generally,
evidentiary hearings before an immigration judge 8'
evidentiary hearings in deportation proceedings are conducted in the
presence of the respondent or in his absence where both parties
agree to that effect." 3 The appearance of the respondent through
In case of
videoconferencing or by telephone may also be sufficient'
8
8 The
is
required.
telephonic appearance, the consent of the respondent
respondent may also be represented by counsel at no cost to the
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. See Liu v. Bd. of Immigration Appeals, 167 Fed. Appx. 871, 874 (2d Cir. 2006); see
also Bernstein, supra note 178. In another similar confrontation between an immigration
judge and an Afghan immigrant respondent, an anonymous news source reported:
"[The applicant] broke down and wept after yesterday's court hearing before an
immigration judge who had smiled, chuckled, shaken his head and rolled his eyes
during portions of [the applicant's] testimony .

. .

. [The judge] suddenly

interrupted [the cross-examining government attorney] and, for more than 30
minutes, questioned [the applicant] himself, often yelling, and ask-ing [sic] the
same question repeatedly. [The judge] suggested that [the applicant] was being
'evasive' and not 'responsive' to questions designed to determine whether his
testimony was believable. During the hearing, [the judge], who . . . serves the
U.S. Justice Department, interrupted the proceedings on several occasions to
scold either the translator... or the attorney representing the Afghans."
Anker, supra note 150, at 498 n.296 (quoting an anonymous newspaper) (alterations in
original).
182. See INA § 240, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2000).
183. See id. § (b)(2)(A)(i)-(ii).
184. See id. § (b)(2)(A)(iii)-(iv).
185. See id. § (b)(2)(B) ("An evidentiary hearing on the merits may only be conducted
through a telephone conference with the consent of the alien involved after the alien has
been advised of the right to proceed in person or through videoconference.").
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government.'
The immigration judge is obligated to inform the
respondent that he may be represented by an attorney throughout the
proceedings.' 87
Although these provisions seem to suggest extremely flexible and
accommodating appearance procedures, the consequence of an alien's
failure to appear at a scheduled hearing is complete disqualification from
the proceedings. In a stark departure from the flexible standards
otherwise followed, the INA provides: "Any alien who, after written
notice required under paragraph (1) or (2) of section 1229(a) of this title
has been provided to the alien or the alien's counsel of record, does not
attend a proceeding under this section, shall be ordered removed in
absentia .

. . . "'

The absentia removal order may only be rescinded if

the alien files a motion to reopen within 180 days and "demonstrates that
1 89
the failure to appear was because of exceptional circumstances.
Subsection (e)(1) defines exceptional circumstances as "exceptional
circumstances ... beyond the control of the alien." '9 The rule expressly

limits these circumstances to "battery or extreme cruelty to the alien or
any child or parent of the alien, serious illness of the alien, or serious
illness or death of the spouse, child, or parent of the alien.'. 9
It
effectively limits such circumstances to serious illness or death of a close
relative by saying exceptional
circumstances do not include "less
192
compelling circumstances.'
Although this procedural requirement may appear to have an
insignificant consequence on the overall immigration adjudication
system, the consequences of denying an alien seeking relief from removal
(particularly in the form of asylum and withholding of removal) the
186. See id. § (b)(4)(A); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1240.3, 1292.1 (2007); see also Orantes-Hernandez
v. Thornburgh, 919 F.2d 549, 554 (9th Cir. 1990); Olvera v. INS, 504 F.2d 1372, 1374 (5th
Cir. 1974).
187. See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(a)(1); see also Michel, 21 I. & N. Dec. 1101, 1102 (1998)
(holding that failure to inform the respondent of his right to counsel was a reversible
error). Because there are currently no government sponsored representation services,
most respondents defend the charges pro se. According to a report by the Congressional
Commission on Religious Freedom, represented asylum seekers are twelve times more
likely to be granted favorable relief than those who are not represented. See 1 U.S.
COMM'N ON INT'L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 17, at 34. Although strict rules
apply, once the respondent is represented, he may raise an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim to invalidate any orders that would not have been imposed but for the
ineffective assistance under very limited circumstances. See, e.g., Maravilla v. Ashcroft,
381 F.3d 855, 858 (9th Cir. 2004). But see Assad v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 471 (5th Cir. 2004).
188. INA § 240(b)(5)(A).

189.
190.
191.
192.

Id. § (b)(5)(C).
Id. § 240, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229a(e)(1) (West Supp. 2007).
Id.
Id.

2007]

Revisiting the Rules in DeportationProceedings

chance to be heard at a proceeding could be quite dramatic. Often,
aliens seeking asylum or other types of relief fail to appear for reasons
that may not necessarily fit into the exceptional circumstances rule but
could be completely unavoidable for them for several reasons.
Evidently, asylum seekers currently get no form of housing and financial
assistance from the government. As a result, those who are not detained
often share shelters operated by non-profit organizations or apartment
units with other immigrants.' 93 The possibility of misplacement of mail is
quite high. Related to the housing problem, immigrants often move from
place to place in pursuit of a place to live. Mailings usually get delayed
or lost altogether. By the time the asylum seeker finds out about a
scheduled appearance, it maybe too late. This is not an uncommon
problem. Because many immigrants do not have representation, all it
takes is for one mailing to get lost or misplaced for an immigrant to be
disqualified from seeking relief from removal.194
Lack of reliable transportation may be another common problem.
Immigration courts are often located in business districts of major cities.
Newly arriving asylum seekers are usually not properly oriented about
their new environment. They usually would not know how much time it
would take to get to the court. Most do not get any form of
transportation assistance. For example, the author of this Article
unsuccessfully attempted to assist an asylum seeker against whom an
absentia removal order was entered. In this case, the non-citizen sought
asylum as soon as he arrived in the United States. He shared housing
with other immigrants in Alexandria, Virginia. The Service referred his
case to an immigration court in Baltimore. The court in Baltimore
scheduled him for a hearing. On the day of the hearing, a friend of his
who offered to drive him to the court simply failed to show up. He had
no idea as to how to get to court on his own, so he rented a taxi, and the
taxi was delayed because of unusual traffic in Baltimore. He arrived 15
minutes late. Although his attorney was in the court room, the judge
exercised the option of entering an absentia order. The BIA upheld the
absentia removal order. As of the writing of this Article, the asylum
seeker is waiting his removal, having lost at every stage. Eventually, his
removal would mean that he would be deported without a single judge
193. See, e.g., Kelly Brewington, Pa. Volunteers Reach Out to Asylum-Seekers, BALT.
SUN, Dec. 5, 2005, at IA.
194. See Andrew 1. Schoenhaltz & Jonathan Jacobs, The State of Asylum

Representation: Ideas for Change, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 739, 742 (2002) ("[A]ccess to
counsel in our current system is limited."). In many jurisdictions, a default judgment in a
civil action may be set aside because of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect,
unavoidable causality, or misfortune. See 49 C.J.S. Judgments, § 401 (1997). For instance,
loss or miscarriage of mail maybe considered an unavoidable casualty or misfortune. See,
e.g., Kellogg v. Smith, 42 P.2d 493,494 (Okla. 1935).
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hearing his case. These types of absentia removal orders are issued
routinely. 195 This is indeed a very rigid procedural rule in a very flexible
adjudicatory environment.
This rule exists in stark contrast to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure default judgment rules, in spite of the fact that deportation
proceedings are rhetorically considered to be civil proceedings. The
Federal Rules allow the rendering of default judgments whenever the
defendant fails to appear or otherwise fails to defend against the action.1 96
However, the rules provide that a default judgment maybe set aside:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may
relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1)
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly
discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have
been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule
59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or
extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse
party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been
satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon
which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is
no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective
application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the
operation of the judgment9
Under these rules, default judgment is not even mandatory; it is left for
the trial court's discretion.'9 In fact, it is a highly disfavored form of
disposition of cases. Federal courts always prefer the dispensation of
cases on their own merits rather than on mere technicalities such as
failure to appear.?

In criminal proceedings, the presence of the defendant is a serious
matter, as it involves constitutional rights relating to one's liberty
interest. As such, it is zealously guarded. The Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure clearly provide that the presence of the defendant is required

195. See generally Damon W. Taaffe, Comment, Tolling the Deadline for Appealing in
Abstentia DeportationOrders Due to Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 68 U. CHI. L. REV.
1065 (2001) (discussing equitable tolling as one solution to the problem of in abstentia
orders).
196. See FED. R. Civ. P. 55(a).
197. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b) (emphasis added).
198. FED. R. CIV. P. 55(a).
199. See, e.g., Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co., Inc. v. Metal Trades Council of
Amarillo Tex. & Vicinity, 726 F.2d 166, 168 (5th Cir. 1984); First Am. Bank v. United
Equity Corp., 89 F.R.D. 81, 86-87 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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at every stage of the proceedings, with few exceptions. 2 Neither the civil
procedure rules nor the criminal procedure rules of appearance resemble
the INA rules relating to appearance of respondents in deportation
proceedings. The INA rules are exceedingly harsh and unforgiving. A
close family member's death or something of that nature must happen
for an absentia removal order to be withdrawn. 21 Life is full of
unavoidable but excusable misfortunes that would cause a person to miss
an appointment. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provision
discussed above offers very good guidance with this respect. For a
justiciable outcome, the INA rules of appearance must be revised in light
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
2. Burden and Standardof Proof

Before a discussion of some of the most important evidentiary rules
applicable in deportation proceedings, it is important to briefly note the
burden and standard of proof relating to these proceedings. The level of
due process an immigrant receives depends on whether that person has
been lawfully admitted or not. "Admission" is a term of art signifying
not the mere physical entry or presence of the person but strictly the
"lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and
authorization by an immigration officer." 2°2 Persons who make entry
without inspection are deemed inadmissible regardless of their physical
presence in the country. 03 Persons who have been inspected and
admitted but overstay their authorized period of time are deemed
deportable. 4 The legal process instituted against persons in either one

200. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 43. Exceptions include sentencing correction proceedings
and all phases of misdemeanor cases where the defendant is voluntarily absent. See FED.

R. CRIM. P. 43(b)(2), (4). Although criminal defendants are ordinarily arrested and
brought before a court, most suspects are in fact free on bail and have to go to court for
their trials. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, Pretrial Release and Detention Statistics,
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pretrial.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2007).

This situation is

analogous to immigrants who defend against charges of removability while not being
detained.

See Immigration Equality, Frequently Asked Questions About Detention

Under U.S. Immigration Law, http://www.immigrationequality.org/template.php?pageid=
181 (last visited Nov. 11, 2007).
201. See INA § 240,8 U.S.C.A. § 1229a(e)(1) (West Supp. 2007).
202. Id. § 101, 8 U.S.C. § Il01(a)(13)(A) (2000). This provision, which is a part of the
IIRIRA, made a clear distinction between people who have been inspected and admitted
and those whose entrance was surreptitious.
203. See id. § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) (2000); 8 C.F.R. § 235.1(d)(iv)(D)(2)
(2007).
204. See generally INA § 237(a)(1), 8 U.S.C § 1227(a)(1) (2000). All grounds of
inadmissibility are indeed considered grounds of deportability. See id. § 237(a)(1)(A).
Other grounds also include violations after admission. See id. § 237(a)(1)(B); see also 8
C.F.R. § 103.12 (defining lawful presence).
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205

of these categories is called a removal proceeding. Some inadmissible
persons may be subjected to summary or expedited proceedings . 20' The
statute makes a clear distinction between the burden and standard of
proof applicable to an alien applying for admission and an admitted alien
seeking relief from deportation. 207 Because this Article deals with
procedural and evidentiary matters in adversarial deportation or removal
proceedings involving persons seeking relief from deportation rather
than those seeking admission in different forums, the evidentiary issues
involved in the various levels of non-adversarial administrative inquiries
of inadmissibility are not discussed.20 8 As such, the discussion of the
burden and standard of proof is also limited to adversarial deportation
proceedings.
A formal removal process is set in motion when the DHS files a
charging document called a Notice to Appear (NTA) with the
immigration court in the locality where the respondent is known to
reside. 2°' The NTA charges that a non-citizen is removable for specific
violations sanctioned under the INA.2101 Once the NTA is properly
served on the respondent, 2 he may answer the charges, and seek relief
from deportation. Among the several forms of relief that a respondent
may seek, the following are the most common: voluntary departure,
cancellation of removal, adjustment of status, asylum/withholding, 212 and
relief under the Convention Against Torture.
While the DHS bears
the burden of proving that the respondent is removable by clear and

205.

See generally INA § 240.

The IIRIRA replaced the traditional distinction

between exclusion and deportation by a unified procedure called removal. See IRIRA,
Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 304, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-587 to 597 (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. §§ 1229-1229c).
206. See INA § 235, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (2000).
207. See id. § 240(c)(2).
208. Applicants for asylum in affirmative asylum cases are interviewed by an
immigration officer who seeks to determine their eligibility. This is an informal nonadversarial administrative process. Almost all types of evidence are admitted and
considered. See generally 8 C.F.R. § 208.9. These kinds of informal administrative
processes are outside the purview of this Article.
209. See INA § 239, 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1) (2000). The NTA is normally prepared
using Form 1-862. See 8 C.F.R. § 235.6.
210. See INA § 239(a)(1). The NTA contains information such as the nature of the
charges, the provisions of the law alleged to have been violated, the legal authority of the
proceedings, etc. See id.
211. Id. (providing that proper service requires that the NTA be given to the
respondent in person or mailed to him at his, or his counsel's, latest known address); 8
C.F.R. § 1003.13.
212. See generally INA § 237, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1) (2000).
213. See Convention Against Torture, supra note 101; see also Foreign Affairs Reform
and Restructuring Act of 1998, P. L. No. 105-277, § 2242, 112 Stat. 2681-761, 2681-822.
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convincing evidence, t 4 the burden shifts to the respondent to prove that
he is eligible for a particular type of relief.215 Accordingly, the
respondent must not only demonstrate his statutory eligibility but also
that he merits a favorable exercise of discretion.216
Both parties must carry their burden of proof. They are required to
present pertinent and credible evidence. As indicated above, under the
INA rules of evidence, the only limitation to the admissibility of evidence
The following section discusses the
is essentially redundancy.
shortcomings of the INA rules of evidence with respect to some of the
most important forms of evidence used in deportation proceedings.
3. Testimonial Evidence

The respondent's testimony is often the single most important
evidence in deportation proceedings, particularly when relief in the form
of asylum or withholding of deportation is sought. Theoretically, in
asylum proceedings, the applicant's credible testimony may be sufficient
to carry the burden of proof even if uncorroborated."' The Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently elaborated the policy behind
this rule as follows:
The policy behind a rule permitting reliance solely on
credible testimony is simple. Many asylum applicants flee their
home countries under circumstances of great urgency. Some
are literally running for their lives and have to abandon their
families, friends, jobs, and material possessions without a word
of explanation. They often have nothing but the shirts on their
backs when they arrive in this country. To expect these
214. Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 286 & n.19 (1966) (holding that "no deportation
order may be entered unless it is found by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence
that the facts alleged as grounds for deportation are true"). The Service must show that
the respondent is removable either because of immigration violations or disqualifying
criminal convictions. See, e.g., id.; see also INA § 237(a). In some situations, such as
marriage and illegal entry, the non-citizen may bear the burden of showing that he is not
deportable. It is usually presumed in these cases that a prima facie case of deportability
has been made from the outset. See, e.g., Patel v. Ashcroft, 104 Fed. Appx. 966, 970 (5th
Cir. 2005); see also Iran v. INS, 656 F.2d 469, 471 (9th Cir. 1981). Cf Navia-Duran v. INS,
568 F.2d 803, 811 (1st Cir. 1977).
215. See INA § 240, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229a(c)(4)(A) (West 2005). The REAL ID Act
amended INA section 240 and elaborated the applicable standards. See REAL ID Act of
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 101(d), 119 Stat. 302, 304.
216. INA § 240(c)(4)(A). Most forms of relief are discretionary, including cancellation
of removal under INA section 240 or Asylum under INA section 208. See id.; id. § 208, 8
U.S.C.A. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (West 2005). However, the grant of withholding of removal
under the Refugee Act of 1980 and the Convention Against Torture is not discretionary.
Precisely because of that reason, the standard of proof is significantly higher. See INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436, 441 (1987).
217. See 8 C.F.R §§ 208.13(a), 208.16(b), 1208.13(a), 1208.16(b) (2007).
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individuals to stop and collect dossiers of paperwork before
fleeing is both unrealistic and strikingly insensitive to the
218
harrowing conditions they face.
Although corroboration is said to be unnecessary when the testimony
is credible, the challenge always is to verify the credibility of the
testimony. Evidently, corroborative evidence makes testimony more
credible.21 ' That means, in practice, applicants with corroborating
evidence are more likely to succeed.
In amending the INA, The REAL ID Act of 2005 modified the
standard of proof in asylum proceedings. It provides that corroboration
is generally not required if the trier of fact is convinced that the
testimony is indeed credible 22. However, it also provides:
In determining whether the applicant has met [her] burden, the
trier of fact may weigh the credible testimony along with other
evidence of record. Where the trier of fact determines that the
applicant should provide evidence that corroborates otherwise
credible testimony, such evidence must be provided unless the
applicant does not have the evidence and cannot reasonably
obtain the evidence.22'
The REAL ID Act also subjects the determination of credibility to
specific standards. It provides that there is no presumption of credibility,
and that credibility must be determined based on the totality of the
circumstances with due regard to all relevant facts.222 These factors
include:
demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of the applicant or
witness, the inherent plausibility of the applicant's or witness's
account, the consistency between the applicant's or witness's
written and oral statements (whenever made and whether or
not under oath, and considering the circumstances under which
the statements were made), the internal consistency of each
such statement, the consistency of such statements with other
evidence of record (including the reports of the Department of
218. Dawoud v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 608, 612-13 (7th Cir. 2005); see also Yang v. U.S.
Attorney Gen., 418 F.3d 1198, 1201 (11th Cir. 2005); Karouni v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1163,
1173-74 (9th Cir. 2005); Ahmadshah v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 917, 920-21 (8th Cir. 2005);
Njuguna v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 765, 769-71 (9th Cir. 2004); Secaida-Rosales v. INS, 331
F.3d 297, 311 (2d Cir. 2003).
219. See, e.g., Njuguna, 374 F.3d at 771 (concluding that "[g]iven the absence of any
contradictory evidence .....
[any reasonable finder of fact would be compelled to
conclude that [the petitioner for asylum] ...

[was] ... eligible").

220. REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 101(a)(3)(B)(ii), 119 Stat. 302, 303
(codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii)) (amending INA § 208).
221. INA § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii).
222. Id. § 208 (b)(1)(B)(iii).
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State on country conditions) and any inaccuracies or falsehoods
in such statements, without regard to whether an inconsistency,
inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant's
claim, or any other relevantfactor.2 3
As this provision makes clear, any conceivable form of evidence may
be used to contradict the witness's testimony or impeach the witness
regardless of the nature of the evidence used for contradiction or
impeachment purposes. The adoption of these standards has been the
subject of immense criticism;114 however, it remains the operative rule. A
simple reading of these rules suggests the reason why inconsistency and
unpredictability characterize asylum proceedings. It is quite difficult to
objectively determine credibility in any legal proceeding."'
Unfortunately, factual findings of the trier of fact in deportation
proceedings almost always stand because the BIA can only review
'
determinations of fact when they are "clearly erroneous."226
That is an
additional reason to get the facts right in the first place as they are not
reviewable absent extraordinary circumstances."' As the focus of this
Article is on the rules regulating the admissibility of evidence, no
comments on the standards themselves are included. In fact, it is the
main thrust of this Article that well-conceived evidentiary rules could
help bridge the gaps left by the substantive rules. For example, the
evidentiary rules could limit the types of evidence used to contradict
testimony or impeach the witness.
The existing rules do not in any way limit the government's ability to
submit any kind of evidence to contradict the witness's statement or
impeach the witness. When the only evidence is the respondent's
testimony, the consequences of allowing such unlimited admissibility
could be dramatic. As indicated in Part IV below, DOL-tyle modified
rules of evidence that take into account the specific circumstances of
deportation proceedings could be very helpful to ensure a consistent,
predictable, and justiciable outcome. Some of the most common trial
223. Id. (emphasis added).
224. See, e.g., Dawn Herzog Jewell, Death Sentence?: Immigration Bill Could
Jeopardize Asylum Seekers, Critics Say, CHRISTIANITYTODAY, Apr. 2005, at 26, 26; see
also Editorial, On Guard America, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2005, at A18; Doris Meissner, Not
Broke, Don't Fix, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 20 2005, at B5; Lin Piwowarczyk, Op-Ed,
Unwelcome Mat, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 25, 2005, at A13.
225. See Michael Kagan, Is Truth in the Eye of the Beholder? Objective Credibility
Assessment in Refugee Status Determination, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 367, 379 (2003)

(elaborating the difficulties involved in objective determination of credibility).
226. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i) (2007).
227. See Feto v. Gonzales, 433 F.3d 902, 911 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding that the
determination of credibility is a matter of fact and must not be disturbed unless
extraordinary circumstances are present).
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tools and forms of evidence used by the government to contradict the
respondent's testimony, impeach the witness, or otherwise undermine
the respondent's case in deportation proceedings are discussed below.
(a) Cross-examination

Both parties have the right to cross-examine or otherwise test the
228
As with any
credibility of the witness presented by the other party.
legal proceeding, cross-examination is one of the most important tools
that DHS attorneys use to undermine the credibility of a witness, mainly
the respondent herself. The author of this Article has witnessed DHS
cross-examination of a respondent that lasted more than 3 hours. There
is virtually no limitation as to what questions may be asked regardless of
whether they pertain to any disputed issues or not. The Federal Rules of
Evidence put a reasonable limit to the scope of cross-examination. Rule
611 provides: "Cross-examination should be limited to the subject matter
of the direct examination and matters affecting the credibility of the
witness. The court may, in the exercise of discretion, permit inquiry into
additional matters as if on direct examination. 22 9 The fundamental
concerns that necessitated this limitation include: (1) "A party vouches
230
for his own witness but only to the extent of matters elicited on direct;,
(2) leading questions may not be asked in examination-in-chief as a party
may not ask his own witness leading questions;23' and (3) limiting the
232
scope of cross-examination facilitates the orderly conduct of the trial.
All of these considerations apply in deportation proceedings. In fact,
the imposition of some limitation on the scope of cross-examination in
deportation proceedings is desirable for even more important reasons.
Overzealous DHS attorneys could easily use cross-examination to
intimidate or harass respondent's witnesses or the respondent herself.
Immigration practitioners routinely complain about this. Thus, an
evidentiary rule must specifically state the purpose of cross-examination.
A good model is Rule 611(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. It
provides: "The court shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and
order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1)
make the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment
228. See INA § 240, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229a(b)(1), (b)(4)(B) (West 2005); see also 8 C.F.R.
§ 1240.10(a)(4).
229. FED. R. EVID. 611(b).
230. FED. R. EVID. 611(b) advisory committee's note (citing Resurrection Gold
Mining Co. v. Fortune Gold Mining Co., 129 F. 668, 675 (8th Cir. 1904)). But see FED. R.
EVID. 607 ("The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party, including the party
calling the witness.").
231. FED. R. EVID. 611(b) advisory committee's note.
232. Id. (citing Finch v. Weiner, 145 A. 31 (Conn. 1929)).
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of the truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect
witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment."23 The immigration

court environment could be very intimidating for a non-citizen who faces
government attorneys who are often very experienced and treated with
some degree of reverence by defense attorneys and immigration judges
alike. Unless properly limited, cross-examination could easily be used
not only to harass but also to intimidate the witness to the point where
the witness may be afraid of telling the truth. Strict rules with respect to
this problem are essential.
Another important reason for limiting the scope of cross-examination
is the very real concern for the possibility of self-incrimination. As
indicated above, the main witness in deportation proceedings,
particularly in asylum and withholding of removal cases, is the
respondent herself. Anyone subjected to any kind of legal proceedings,
234
civil or criminal, may invoke the privilege against self-incrimination.
However, almost always-unlike a criminal defendant who does not bear
the burden of proving his innocence-a respondent in a deportation
proceeding has no choice but to testify on his own behalf because he
bears the burden of proving his defenses against deportation."' Failure
to take the stand not only leaves the respondent without evidence, but
also subjects him to negative inferences that could further undermine his
236
case.
(b) PriorInconsistent Statements and Other Similar Evidence

As indicated above, there are no meaningful limitations on the
admissibility of evidence in deportation proceedings except, of course,

233. FED. R. EvID. 611(a) (emphasis added).
234. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444-45 (1972)
("[The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination] can be asserted in any
proceeding, civil or criminal, administrative of judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory; and
it protects against any disclosures that the witness reasonable believes could be used in a
criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might be so used."); see also
Bigby v. INS, 21 F.3d 1059, 1063 (11th Cir. 1994) (providing an example of an effective
privilege invocation in a BIA proceeding). But see United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666,
700 (1998) (holding that the privilege against self-incrimination does not extend to the
possibility of foreign prosecution). It is also important to note that Miranda warnings are
not applicable in deportation cases. See United States v. Solano-Godines, 120 F.3d 957,
960 (9th Cir. 1997). Cf. United States v. Kiam, 432 F.3d 524, 529 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding
that Mirandawarnings are not necessary before administrative border inspections).
235. See discussion supra Part II.C.2.
236. See United States ex rel Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 153-54 (1923) ("Silence
is often evidence of the most persuasive character."); Solano-Godines,120 F.3d at 962 ("In
civil proceedings . . . the Fifth Amendment does not forbid fact finders from drawing
adverse inferences against a party who refuses to testify.").
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Immigration
generally applicable due process considerations.237
regulations provide for the admissibility of "any oral or written statement
that is material and relevant to any issue in the case previously made by
the respondent or any other person during any investigation, examination,
the
hearing, or trial," to contradict the testimony
1. 238 or undermine
respondent's evidence in deportation proceedings. Apart from serious
hearsay problems, which are discussed separately below,39 the admission
of all these kinds of prior statements and evidence is almost
unprecedented in any other type of legal proceeding.
For example, the Federal Rules of Evidence provide: "Extrinsic
evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by a witness is not admissible
unless the witness is afforded an opportunity to explain or deny the same
and the opposite party is afforded an opportunity to interrogate the
witness thereon, or the interests of justice otherwise require., 240 This rule
contains some guarantees of reliability even when the extrinsic evidence
contains the alleged statements of the witness. The immigration
regulations allow the admissibility of extrinsic evidence containing
statements made not only by the witness, but also by other persons
during any "investigation" or "examination. '' 241The rules provide for no

guarantees of reliability or mandatory opportunity for the respondent to
challenge the evidence. Immigration courts routinely admit such
extrinsic evidence without restriction.
Some very commonly used forms of evidence employed by DHS
attorneys to undermine the respondent's case are documents or forms
containing the respondent's statements given to a border patrol agent or
an immigration officer at an airport, or even the statements of the agents
themselves. For example, in Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that airport interview records may
be admitted to challenge credibility of the testimony of the respondent in
deportation proceedings.2 42 The court developed a four-part test for the
determination of the reliability of such prior records: (1) whether the
record was verbatim or a summary thereof; (2) whether detailed
questions were asked to develop the record; (3) the applicant's
reluctance to answer questions because of prior coercive experience; and
finally (4) whether there were issues of English translation.243

237. See, e.g., Hassan v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 429, 435 (6th Cir. 2005).
238. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.7(a) (2007) (emphasis added).
239. See infra Part III.C.
240.
241.
242.
243.

FED. R. EvID. 613(b).
8 C.F.R. § 1240.7(a).
Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 2004).
Id. at 180.
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These factors, however, only pertain to the weight of the evidence, not
the very issue of admissibility. Regardless of how a piece of evidence
performs under the four-part test, it would be put in the record and the
judge's credibility decision would inevitably be negatively influenced by
such evidence.
The respondent's statements are usually made
immediately upon arrival under very stressful conditions, are not very
well thought out, and are often vitiated due to fear of being put on the
next flight back where serious consequences may follow.244 This remains
a serious problem.
In fact, the most comprehensive report ever
mandated by Congress, and undertaken by the Commission on
International Religious Freedom, concluded that reliance on prior
statements made at ports of entry is a cause for serious concern.145 The
report stated:
The lack of congruence between the observations of our
research assistants and the official records prepared by the
investigating officers (A-files) suggests that the asylum process
itself may be compromised by the use of these documents as
official transcripts. We found that when CBP officials failed to
ask the relevant fear questions, the official record frequently
indicated that these questions had been asked and answered,
typically containing just the word "no" in response to fear
questions that had not been asked.
Likewise, on some
occasions the A-files did not indicate that the relevant questions
had been asked (i.e., were left blank) when our observers noted
that they had been, or contained only a portion of the
information that had been disclosed in response to a given
question. These discrepancies, however, only reflect the most
simplistic level of analysis, since the A-files might have
provided incorrect information in many more cases but could
not be detected because of our inability to simultaneously
observe Secondary Inspection interviews and compare them
with A-files. Nevertheless, these data demonstrate that A-files
do not necessarily present an accurate record of Secondary
Inspection interviews, despite the temptation to assume their
246
accuracy.
The same report indicated that: "Officials may present statements
from the Secondary Inspection interview as evidence to impeach an
aliens' [sic] testimony, citing contradictions between their statements and

244. See Ramsameachire,357 F.3d at 179.
245. Allen Keller, Andrew Rasmussen, Kim Reeves & Barry Rosenfeld, Evaluation of
Credible Fear Referral in Expedited Removal at Ports of Entry in the United States, in 2
U.S. COMM'N ON INT'L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 17, at 1, 30.
246. Id.
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the official records as evidence of a changing story, when the 'evidence' is
an erroneous official record., 247 The report goes on stating:
In addition, aggressive or hostile interview techniques, sarcasm
and ridicule of aliens, and verbal threats or accusations, while
not common, were not infrequent in our sample. The fact that
these behaviors occurred while observers were present suggests
that such behavior may not even be perceived as problematic by
some CBP officers.2' 4
Despite all of these serious concerns, statements contained in these
documents are routinely admitted in deportation proceedings.
Regulating their admissibility by evidentiary rules is only appropriate.
The immigration regulations go even further and allow the
admissibility of records containing prior statements made by persons
other than the witness.249 Predicated on this rule, courts of appeals have
upheld the admissibility of records kept by immigration officers at ports
of entry to impeach or otherwise undermine the evidence offered by the
respondent."' Immigration courts routinely admit such evidence despite
the concerns stated above. Part of the problem with these types of
evidence is hearsay. The hearsay aspect of the problem is discussed
It is sufficient to state here that as consistently argued
below.251
throughout this Article, a DOL-type modified rule that takes into
account the special conditions of deportation proceedings is not only

Id. (citation omitted). The report also stated:
The safeguard against inaccurate A-file records, asking aliens to attest to the
accuracy of their statements, also appears inadequate as currently implemented.
Roughly one in six cases in which statements were taken by CBP officers and
recorded in A-files were not confirmed by aliens, despite the presence of
signatures in the required place. When they were asked to confirm their
statements, most aliens were neither asked to read the statements, nor had their
statements read to them, but were simply told to sign forms. Aliens were often
told to sign documents with little or no explanation of what they were signing or
what the implications might be, and in most cases these documents were written
in a language they were not able to read (English). Failure to confirm statements
was more common in cases where the individual was referred for Credible Fear
interviews, despite the fact that these statements have the potential to be used in
subsequent Asylum Interviews and Hearings.

247.

Id.
248. Id. at 31.
249. See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.7(a) (2007).
250. See, e.g., Prawira v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 661, 663 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that the
immigration judge properly admitted an immigration officer's notes pertaining to a
pending foreign investigation with a bearing on the respondent's documentary evidence);
Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 179-80 (2d Cir. 2004) (finding that records kept
during ports of entry interviews could be admitted to impeach credibility).
251. See infra Part III.C.5.
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desirable, but also necessary to alleviate the evidentiary problems
associated with the admission of such evidence.
4. Exclusionary Rules
In INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, the Supreme Court held that the
exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment does not apply in
deportation proceedings because deportation proceedings are considered
civil proceedings. 252
In Lopez-Mendoza, federal agents arrested
respondents from their workplace without authorization, and used
illegally obtained evidence during the respondents' deportation
proceedings. The respondents challenged the admissibility of the
evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds. 253 The Court held that the
social cost of exclusion of illegally obtained evidence in deportation
proceedings far outweighs any benefits that exclusion of such evidence
might ensure.2 The four most important reasons that the court noted in
support of its conclusion are: (1) illegally obtained evidence often has a
marginal role in deportation proceedings as deportability may be proven
using other evidence;25 (2) few, if any, immigrants actually challenge the
admissibility of evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds; 256 (3) the INS
[now called USCIS] has sufficient institutional deterrence mechanisms;2 7
and finally (4) there is always the possibility of sanctions against agents
who engage in misconduct.2 8
The Court, however, noted that unlawfully obtained evidence may be
excluded if there is reason to believe that the Service is engaged in
widespread violations of the Fourth Amendment.9 The Court also
specifically stated that this decision must not be interpreted as a shield
for "egregious violations of Fourth Amendment or other liberties that
might transgress notions of fundamental fairness and undermine the
probative value of the evidence obtained. ''260 Police stops exclusively

252. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1045-46, 1050 (1984).
253. See id. at 1034-35.
254. Id. The court applied the balancing test used under United States v. Janis, 428
U.S. 433, 454, 459-60 (1976) (holding that illegally obtained evidence may be admissible in
IRS tax proceedings, because of the civil nature of the proceedings, where the marginal
deterrence benefit gained by applying the exclusionary rule does not outweigh the societal
cost of excluding relevant evidence).
255. See Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1043.
256. Id. at 1044.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 1045.
259. See id. at 1050.
260. Id. at 1050-51.
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based on race were, for instance, held to fit the "egregious violations"
exception."'
Obviously, it is very difficult to prove "egregious violations" in each
individual case where unlawfully obtained evidence is used. In LopezMendoza, the Court did not consider the values protected by the
exclusion of unlawfully obtained evidence
S- 262 to outweigh the interest of
Immigration courts now
expediency in deportation proceedings.
routinely admit illegally obtained evidence and base their deportation
The effect of this rule is not limited to
orders on such evidence.
immigration. The culture of relying on unlawful evidence could indeed
have far reaching consequences. The author of this Article has noticed
the use of evidence obtained through a violation of the Fourth
Amendment. Because challenging such evidence under the "egregious
violations" exception could be very difficult and subject to a long
process, such violations often remain unchallenged.264 It is not difficult to
imagine the culture that a rule of admitting unlawfully obtained evidence
in court could create. It would undoubtedly affect the integrity of the
system itself. In fact, it is easy for anyone who observes deportation
proceedings to see that there is a subculture of tolerated irregularity. 65
As consistently argued throughout this Article, each deviation from the
traditional rules of admissibility of evidence contributes to such
The admissibility of illegally obtained
undesirable irregularities.
evidence is thus one of such matters that need to be revisited with due
regard to the peculiarities of deportation proceedings.
5. Hearsay

"Nothing can be more essential than the cross-examining [of]
witnesses, and generally before the triers of the facts in question ...
[W]ritten evidence ...[is] almost useless; it must be frequently taken ex

261.

See Gonzalez-Rivera v. INS, 22 F.3d 1441, 1443 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that a

race-based stop constitutes an "egregious violation"); see also Orhorhaghe v. INS, 38 F.3d
488, 492, 502 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that evidence obtained through a search that
amounted to an "egregious violation" must be suppressed although the violation did not
affect the reliability of the evidence). Illegally obtained evidence may sometimes be
suppressed under the Fifth Amendment if, for example, a coerced confession is obtained.
See, e.g., Navia-Duran v. INS, 568 F.2d 803, 804-05, 808, 811 (1st Cir. 1977).
262. See Lopez-Moendoza, 468 U.S. at 1048-50.
263. See, e.g., Navarro-Chalan v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 19 (1st Cir. 2004) (affirming a
deportation order in part because the petitioner failed to prove egregious Fourth
Amendment violations sufficient to invoke the exclusionary rule).
264. See Lopez-Moendoza, 468 U.S. at 1044; see also Navarro-Chalan,359 F.3d at 2223 (finding no "egregious violations").
265. See supra Part I (noting the growing concern regarding this problem).
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porte [sic], and but very seldom leads to the proper discovery of truth. '2 6
This was Letter IV by the Federal Farmers written on October 15, 1787.
The First Congress's response to this message was the inclusion of "the
Confrontation Clause in the proposal that latter became the Sixth
Amendment. ' , 67 The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment
provides: "the accused ' 268
shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the
witnesses against him. ,
The right to confront accusers is a legal tradition that goes as far back
as the ancient Roman times. 269 The more direct and immediate precursor
of the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause is, however, the English
Common Law tradition. Unlike the continental civil law tradition that
relies on written statements of out-of-court fact findings, the English
Common Law adversarial tradition is based on a preference for live incourt testimony with the opportunity for the adverse party to test the
credibility of the testimony. 271
Linked to the concept of the right to confront accusers, the rule against
hearsay is also deeply rooted in the Anglo-American system of justice.272
Professors Wright and Graham cite to a very interesting incident that
occurred in Pennsylvania in 1689. The story is reproduced as follows:
266.

Richard Henry Lee, Observation Leading to a Fair Examination of the System of

Government, 1781, reprinted in 1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 464, 473 (1971), quoted in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S.
36, 49 (2004).
267. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 49.
268. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
269. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43 (citing Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1015 (1988);
Frank R. Herrmann & Brownlow M. Speer, Facing the Accuser: Ancient and Medieval
Precursorsof the Confrontation Clause, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 481 (1994)).
270. See id.
271. Id. This tradition was reinforced by the perceived injustices that were caused by
the application of the civil law examination in the courts of England. The most frequently
referenced political trial with respect to the history of the Confrontation Clause is the trial
in 1603 of Sir Walter Raleigh for the crime of treason. During the trial an alleged
accomplice, Lord Cobham, implicated Raleigh before an investigation council. Id. at 44.
When that evidence was presented in court, the accused said: "'Cobham is absolutely in
the King's mercy; to excuse me cannot avail him; by accusing me he may hope for
favour."' Id. (quoting 1 DAVID JARDINE, CRIMINAL TRIALS 435 (1832)). The accused
then asked the court to bring Cobham so that he could testify in front of Raleigh. Id.
Raleigh argued: "'[t]he Proof of the Common Law is by witness and jury: let Cobham be
here, let him speak it. Call my accuser before my face .... ' Id. (quoting Raleigh's Case,
2 How. St. Tr. 1, 15-16 (1603)) (alterations in original). Unfortunately, the request was
denied, and the accused was convicted and sentenced to death. Id. However, this trial
remained a significant part of the history of the right to confrontation for generations.
The Supreme Court's reference to it in Crawford in 2004 attests to its importance. See id.
272. See generally 30 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 6344 (1997) (providing a comprehensive
discussion of the history of confrontation and the rules against hearsay).
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During a controversy over the rights of the colonists, William
Bradford printed and distributed copies of the Charter and
Frame of Government of the colony. Summoned before the
council by an irate governor, Bradford emulated Lilburne in
refusing to even admit that he had published the offending
pamphlet.
Governor: I desire to know from you, whether you did
print the Charter or not, and who set you to work.
Bradford: Governor, it is surely an impracticable thing
for any man to accuse himself, thou knows it very well.
When the governor suggested that Bradford might be dealt with
more leniently "if you were so ingenuous as to confess",
Bradford replied:
Governor, I desire to know my accusers, I think it very
hard to be put upon accusing myself. * * * But if

anything be laid to my charge let me know my
accusers. I am not bound to accuse myself.273
Professors Wright and Graham argue that this suggests that even at
that time, the connection between the right to confront one's accusers
and the privilege against self-incrimination was very well recognized.
They also argue that the development of the right to confrontation was
significantly impacted by the general hostility against the informants that
Imperial authorities used to assist in the enforcement of their laws.275
As these historical references suggest, fundamental concerns of due
process and justiciability underpin the argument against the admissibility
of hearsay evidence. Although these historical references mainly pertain
to criminal accusations, as does the Sixth Amendment, the Advisory
Committee to the Federal Rules of Evidence expressly rejected any
attempt to split the standards of admissibility of evidence between
273. Id. § 6344, at 424-25 (quoting LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT 360-61 (1968)) (footnotes omitted) (alteration in original).
274. Id. § 6344, at 425. Professors Wright & Graham give another example:
A similar, but richer, set of connections appears in the complaint filed by the
Virginia Council against Governor Nicholson in 1702:
II. He encourages all sorts of sychophants, tattlers, and talebearers, takes
their stories in writing, and if he can persuade or threaten them to swear to
them, without giving the accused person any opportunity of knowing his
accusation or accuser.
Id. (quoting Daniel H. Pollitt, The Right of Confrontation:Its History and Modern Dress,8

J. PUB. L. 381, 391 (1959)) (footnote omitted).
275. Id. § 6344, at 427-28. "The underlying philosophy was to enlist the busybody in
the service of law enforcement by the bait of a share in the penalty, and to make the
proceeding as little nuisance as possible." Id. § 6344, at 427 (quoting JULIUS GOEBEL, JR.
& T. RAYMOND NAUGHTON,

(1944)).
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criminal and civil proceedings.276 The Federal Rules of Evidence define
hearsay as: "a statement, other than one made by the declarant while
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of
the matter asserted." 2"
There is no dispute as to the inherent unreliability of out of court
statements not made under oath and not tested by cross-examination. 8
There is also no dispute that some such statements may have some
indicia of reliability. The general policy followed over the years to
mitigate some of the harsh consequences of the rule against hearsay is
the formulation of well-conceived, time tested, and elaborate exceptions.
Hearsay statements that fall under the very well recognized classical
exceptions are considered reliable and, as such, admissible. Any policy
that significantly departs from this rule that is literally centuries in the
making is drastic indeed. The consequences may be more serious in
some proceedings than in others.
As indicated above, the rule against hearsay contained in the Federal
Rules of Evidence does not apply in administrative proceedings. Courts
have, however, struggled to set other minimum standards for the
admissibility of hearsay in administrative proceedings. This effort was
deemed necessary because of the obvious due process issues involved.
The end result has often been a circular journey back to the judicial
hearsay rule and the exceptions. Hence, the rule allowing the admission
of hearsay in administrative proceedings has only added to the confusion
on the subject.
This may be exemplified by Richardson v. Perales, the leading case
that stands for the proposition that hearsay evidence may be admitted
and can form the basis of administrative decisions.2 79 The Supreme Court
did not find an easy answer to the question, particularly as it pertained to
due process. This case involved a proceeding before the Social Security
Administration. Perales claimed social security benefits because of a
back ailment that was diagnosed and certified by his own physician.
However, other physicians who examined his condition found no
disability.'s ° The medical records kept by the other physicians who
examined him for treatment, as well as for benefit determination, and
records kept by an advisor were presented during the hearing before the
276. See FED. R. EVID. art. VIII advisory committee's introductory note (The Hearsay
Problem).
277.

FED. R. EVID.801(c).

278. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68-69 (2004) ("Where testimonial
statements are at issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional
demands is the one the Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation.").
279. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971).
280. Id. at 390-95.
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Social Security Administration.28 Perales objected to the admissibility of
such evidence on hearsay and lack of cross-examination grounds.m The
evidence was admitted over his objection and served as the basis for the
decision denying the benefits. Perales appealed to the district court,
which remanded the case. 283 The Supreme Court agreed with the Social
Security Administration. The reasoning of the Court is perhaps more
important than the holding. The Court said that consistent with the
APA, the Social Security Act provides that hearsay is "admissible up to
the point of relevancy. ''284 The Court did not, however, leave it there. It
went on analyzing the effect of admitting the specific hearsay on due
process grounds. It noted specifically that "procedural due process is
applicable to the adjudicative administrative proceeding involving 'the
differing rules of fair play, which through the years, have become
associated with differing types of proceedings.' ' 285 It properly weighed
the reliability of the doctor's reports in this case and qualified its holding
by adding that due process requires that admissible hearsay have the
attributes of reliability and probative value such that nothing meaningful
would be expected to be added to the veracity through crossexamination. 8 6 Interestingly, it concluded by saying it all "comes down
to the question of the procedure's integrity and fundamental fairness."'28'
Ironically, the rule against hearsay purports to attain exactly the same
objective, i.e., integrity and fundamental fairness. The BIA has also held
that admissibility of evidence must be based on probative value and
fundamental fairness. 8 When the classic evidentiary theory followed by
all regular courts of law purports to attain the exact same objective, it is
difficult to understand the reason behind admitting hearsay in court-like
administrative proceedings, and then checking the reliability for due
process reasons. Obviously, the due process analysis weighs the
probative value of the evidence against the values protected by its
exclusion. But that is also what the hearsay rule along with its exceptions
essentially does. The question then becomes-who determines the due
process issues? Administrative authorities are now vested with the
power of adjudication using hearsay evidence; however, their decisions
are reviewed for due process. The question remains whether this course
is desirable.
Which is the better alternative: allowing flexible
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.

Id. at 395.
Id.
Id. 395-98.
Id. at 410.
Id. at 401 (quoting Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960)).

286.

See id. at 410.

287.
288.

Id.
See Barcenas, 19 I. & N. Dec. 609, 611 (1988).
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admissibility standards and revising flawed decisions, or subjecting them
to strict rules in the first place and substantially reducing reviewable
cases? The effects of the policy choice to allow flexible admissibility are
obvious. Those who are not able to rectify shortcomings through the
appeals process remain causalities of the policy choice. To the extent the
admission of hearsay expedites or facilitates administrative proceedings,
the risk of error is disproportionately borne by those who are unable to
pursue meaningful appeals. Nowhere is this problem more serious than
in immigration deportation proceedings.
The immigration review situation noted in the introduction and
repeated throughout this Article is a very good example. Lack of strict
and clear evidentiary rules shifts the caseload from administrative
authorities (i.e., immigration courts) to appellate courts. Obviously most
non-citizens who are ordered deported based on any type of evidence do
not have the capability to challenge the decision on appeal. Only a
limited percentage of those affected challenge decisions on due process
or related grounds. If there is any expediency obtained as a result of
admitting the government's hearsay evidence, it is certainly at the
expense of those who are not able to meaningfully challenge the
evidence on appeal.
In Goldberg v. Kelly, the Supreme Court noted that what process is
due depends on "'a determination of the precise nature of the
government function involved as well as of the private interest that has
been affected by governmental action." '2 9 This holding has two
important tests: (1) the nature of the government's function; and (2) the
nature of the private interest affected. Applying these criteria to
deportation proceedings would suggest the need for exercising significant
care. The government's function in deportation proceedings is analogous
to its functions in criminal proceedings. It purports to have the
respondent detained and deported from the United States. The private
interest is also clear, preventing a permanent banishment from the
United States where there may be significant family and other ties, and
deportation to a place where there may be a serious threat of injury to
life or liberty. The use of evidence of questionable validity under these
circumstances cannot be justified. The Court's decisions in Richardson v.
Perales29 and Hannah v. Larche.9. are instructive with this respect.
289. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970) (quoting Cafeteria & Rest. Workers
Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961)).
290. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402-07 (1971).
291. See Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960) ("[W]hen governmental agencies
adjudicate or make binding determinations which directly affect the legal rights of
individuals, it is imperative that those agencies use the procedures which have traditionally
been associated with the judicial process.").
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The Service routinely relies on hearsay evidence to cause the
deportation of non-citizens. Courts sometimes reverse decisions based
on hearsay on substantive due process grounds. For example, in
Alexandrov v. Gonzales, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held
that the immigration court's reliance on hearsay memoranda obtained
from the U.S. Consulate office in a foreign country to undermine an
asylum claim violated due process. 292 Similarly in Ezeagwuna v. Ashcroft,
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that reliance on a
multiple hearsay letter from a State Department official to undermine
293
the credibility of an asylum claimant violated due process.
While a
number of other decisions took this same approach to the due process
check, 9 others employed a higher standard for the reversal of
immigration court decisions on due process grounds. A good example of
the latter approach is Tamenut v. Ashcroft. 95 In his application for
asylum, Tamenut claimed that he was detained and beaten by authorities
of his home government a number of times over a four-month period. 96
The Service introduced a faxed letter written by the U.S. Consulate
office in that country clearly contradicting the allegation.29' The claimant
objected to the admissibility of evidence on the ground that he was not
given the opportunity to rebut it in advance of the trial. The Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the admission of this letter did
not violate due process where the claimant had the opportunity to rebut
it by his testimony during the hearing.2 98 A number of other courts
adopted an even less. demanding
•
299due process check with respect to the
admissibility of hearsay evidence.
Perhaps, the best articulation of the standards of admissibility of
hearsay evidence in deportation proceedings is the Ninth Circuit's 1995
opinion in Espinoza v. INS.3°° In this case the court held: "The sole test
for admission of evidence is whether the evidence is probative and its
292. Alexandrov v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 395,404-07 (6th Cir. 2006).
293. Ezeagwuna v. Ashcroft, 325 F.3d 396, 405-08 (3d Cir. 2003).
294. See, e.g., Olabanji v. INS, 973 F.2d 1232, 1234 (5th Cir. 1992); Cunanan v. INS, 856
F.2d 1373, 1375 (9th Cir. 1988).
295. 361 F.3d 1060 (8th Cir. 2004).
296. Id. at 1060-61.
297. Id. at 1060.
298. Id.
299. See, e.g., Ocasio v. Ashcroft, 375 F.3d 105, 107 (1st Cir. 2004) (admitting wife's
affidavit claiming sham marriage without demanding the presence of the wife for cross);
Nyama v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 812, 815-17 (8th Cir. 2004) (admitting other asylum
applications to impeach the credibility of an asylum applicant with similar stories);
Bachelier v. INS, 625 F.2d 902, 904 (9th Cir. 1980) (relying on affidavits without requiring
an opportunity for cross-examination at the hearing).
300. 45 F.3d 308 (9th Cir. 1995).
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admission is fundamentally fair." 31 The court, however, affirmed the
immigration judge's admission of an immigration form filled out by in
two different handwritings where there was no witness to attest to the
contents.3
It simply held that hearsay is admissible unless it is
fundamentally unfair. It did not find such unfairness in this case. 3°3 In
Hernandez-Guadarrama,the same court held that the admission of
hearsay evidence is fundamentally unfair when the government is
responsible for deporting the declarant thereby making him unavailable
for cross-examination. 3°
In Ocasio v. Ashcroft, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held
that admitting a wife's affidavit claiming sham marriage when the
claimant did not object to the evidence at the hearing is not
fundamentally unfair. In a similar case, however, the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit reached the opposite result. It held that a wife's
affidavit alleging sham marriage is inadmissible hearsay when there is
doubt as to its authenticity and the declarant is not available for crossexamination. 306 These differing approaches clearly show that in the
absence of clear guidance regarding hearsay, a due process check could
be problematic, on top of being limited to only those who are able to
challenge the admissibility of evidence on several stages of appeal.
The immigration court's flexible evidentiary standards go even further
and allow local rules to provide for basic procedural and evidentiary
regulation. For example, in Galicia v. Ashcroft, the Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit held that the immigration court's refusal to admit
evidence for delay or lack of pre-marking of exhibits pursuant to local
rules is not a reversible error.3 7 Similarly, in Sulaiman v. Gonzales, the
same court held that an immigration judge's refusal to admit evidence
submitted one day late is not a reversible error.300
Professor Glicksman argues:
All too often proponents of the administrative law process fail
to recognize that the hearsay rule is not merely an evidence
technicality, but is a fundamental principle that preserves and
protects adversarial due process: "The hearsay rule is not a
technical rule of evidence, but a basic, vital and fundamental
301. Id. at 310; see also Alexandrov v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 395, 404-07 (6th Cir. 2006);
Rojas-Garcia v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 814, 823-24 (9th Cir. 2003).
302. Espinoza, 45 F.3d at 310-li.
303. Id. at 311.
304. Hernandez-Guadarrama v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 674, 680-82 (9th Cir. 2005).
305. Ocasio v. Ashcroft, 375 F.3d 105, 107-08 (1st Cir. 2004).
306. Olabanji v. INS, 973 F.2d 1232, 1234-35 (5th Cir. 1992).
307. Galicia v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 446, 448 (1st Cir. 2005).
308. Sulaiman v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 347, 351 (1st Cir. 2005).
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rule of law which ought to be followed by administrative
agencies at those points in their hearings when facts crucial to
the issue are sought to be placed upon the record."' '
He goes on, stating that "[t]he hearsay rule articulates standards of
relevance, credibility, and fairness, which the adversarial process
demands regardless of the forum."3 °
In view of the above discussion-fundamental fairness being the
general rule-attempting to achieve it on an ad hoc basis rather than
through the well recognized, classic, and time tested evidentiary rules
that purport to attain the exact same objective is not a desirable course.
"Courts that have reviewed these issues are convinced that the threshold
principles of evidence reliability, as represented by the hearsay rule,
constitute the core value of our judicial system., 31 ' As argued throughout
this Article, the result of ad hoc type local rule making by immigration
courts across the nation has resulted in serious inconsistency,
unpredictability, and perhaps fundamental unfairness, which undermines
the integrity of the whole system. It is important that the hearsay rule be
applied in deportation proceedings with well-conceived exceptions that
take the unique circumstances of deportation into account, along the
lines of the DOL rules. Some suggestions with regards to hearsay
exceptions are offered in Part IV below.
6. Administrative Notice of Adjudicative Facts
Administrative notice of facts is considered to be the counterpart of
judicial notice of facts in administrative proceedings. The Federal Rules
of Evidence define a judicially noticed adjudicative fact as "one not
subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known
within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of
accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy
cannot reasonably be questioned., 31 2 When a court takes such notice of
facts, it can bypass the regular process of proof and consider such facts as
conclusively proven.3

3

Because it is a significant departure from the

ordinary way of proving facts, this approach is subject to serious
309. Glicksman, supra note 84, at 141-42.
310. Id. at 142 (quoting Bleilevens v. Commonwealth State Civil Serv. Comm'n, 312
A.2d 109, 111 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973)).
311. Id. at 141.
312.

FED. R. EvID. 201(b) (emphasis added).

313. This is particularly so in civil cases. In criminal cases, such notice may be
considered conclusive, but the jury must be instructed that it does not necessarily have to
consider it conclusive. FED. R. EVID. 201(g) ("In a civil action or proceeding, the court
shall instruct the jury to accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed. In a criminal case,
the court shall instruct the jury that it may, but is not required to, accept as conclusive any
fact judicially noticed.").

2007]

Revisiting the Rules in DeportationProceedings

restrictions. As the language of the above quoted provision suggests, the
14
accuracy of the sources must be verified beyond a reasonable doubt.
Moreover, the party affected by the taking of judicial notice must be
given ample opportunity to challenge it."' Judicial notice is a rule of
convenience designed to eliminate unnecessary expenditure of time and
resources to prove commonly known facts.316
Although the rule relating to administrative notice is predicated on the
same assumptions, it is broader in scope because agencies may take
official notice of facts within their expertise or competency.3 7 In the
immigration context, administrative notice may be taken of: "commonly

known facts such as current events or the contents of official
documents. '318 The commonly used official documents include the
Department of State country condition annual reports, and foreign policy
documents containing analysis and opinion.319 By far the most frequently

used document is the State Department's country conditions report.
Courts have consistently upheld the administrative notice of the accuracy
of facts contained in these State Department reports. For example, the
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in Negeya v. Gonzales, upheld a
decision based on statements contained in a State Department country
condition report.32 ° A number of other courts of appeals have followed
the same approach with respect to State Department reports.321

314. See FED. R. EVID. 201(b).
315. See FED. R. EvID. 201(e) ("A party is entitled upon timely request to an
opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of taking judicial notice and the tenor of the
matter noticed. In the absence of prior notification, the request may be made after
judicial notice has been taken.").
316. See 2 PIERCE, supra note 64, § 10.6, at 743 ("The failure to exercise [judicial
notice] tends daily to smother trials with technicality and monstrously lengthens them
out." (quoting James B. Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence (1898))); see also
Castillo-Villagra v. INS, 972 F.2d 1017, 1026-27 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1991).
317. See, e.g., McLeod v. INS, 802 F.2d 89, 93 n.4 (3d Cir. 1986); Banks v. Schweiker,
654 F.2d 637, 640-41 (9th Cir. 1981).
318. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(iv) (2007).
319. See Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case
Management, 67 Fed. Reg. 54,878, 54,892 (Aug. 26, 2002).
320. Negeya v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 78, 84 (1st Cir. 2005) ("Generally, State
Department reports are a highly probative source of evidence in cases that turn on the
objective reasonableness of an asserted fear of future persecution.").
321. See, e.g., Ambartsoumian v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 85, 93 (3d Cir. 2004)
(characterizing the State Department country condition report as "objective evidence" to
prove absence of past persecution); Kayembe v. Ashcroft, 334 F.3d 231, 235-37 (3d Cir.
2003) (concluding that the State Department country condition report provided
"substantial evidence" regarding the practice of a foreign government); Toptchev v. INS,
295 F.3d 714, 722 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that the State Department country condition
report is reliable because of "the Department's expertise in international affairs"); see also
Palma-Mazariegos v. Gonzales, 428 F.3d 30, 36 (1st Cir. 2005); Gebrehiwot v. Ashcroft,
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A few courts of appeals have taken a different view of state
department reports, recognizing the possible difference between the
points of view of the State Department and the Departments that
Courts of appeals have also
adjudicate immigration matters. 322
questioned the objectivity, specificity, and trustworthiness of such
reports. 323 Regardless of this, however, immigration courts routinely rely
on these reports, often taking administrative notice of the facts stated
therein. Such reports are most often used as evidence of proving
changed country conditions in asylum proceedings. The reports often
contain general statements indicating that there has been a change of
government in the foreign country and the new government seems to be
on the right track towards democracy. Such broad statements are usually
considered as evidence of fundamental change of circumstances and
often cause the denial of requests for asylum.3 4
Rivera-Cruz v. INS demonstrates the problem with taking
administrative notice of facts reported in country condition assessments
of the Department of State. 325 Rivera-Cruz, a native and national of

374 F.3d 723, 725-26 (8th Cir. 2004); Reyes-Sanchez v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 369 F.3d 1239,
1243 (11th Cir. 2004); Meas v. Ashcroft, 363 F.3d 729, 730 (8th Cir. 2004); Hang Kannha
Yuk v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1222, 1236 (10th Cir. 2004).
In Circu v. Ashcroft, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that an
Immigration Court's taking of administrative notice of the contents of a 1999 State
Department country condition report did not amount to an abuse of discretion even when
the notice was taken after the hearing. Circu v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 938, 940 (9th Cir. 2004),
withdrawn, reh'g granted sub nom. Circu v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 622 (9th Cir. 2005),
abrogated by Circu v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc). However, on
rehearing, the Ninth Circuit came to the conclusion that taking notice of the report
without granting the claimant an opportunity to rebut the evidence at the hearing was a
procedural due process violation. Circu, 450 F.3d 990, 993-95.
322. See, e.g., Koliada v. INS, 259 F.3d 482, 487-88 (6th Cir. 2001) (noting that the
State Department's report in the case was prepared specifically for the INS and stating
"[i]t stands to reason that a report produced by one executive department to aid the
litigation of another executive department would often support the second department's
point of view" regardless of its own view); Gallius v. INS, 147 F.3d 34, 43-47 (1st Cir. 1998)
(reversing the denial of an asylum claim that was based heavily on a state department
advisory letter and noting that "'the advice of the State Department is not binding either
on the service or on the courts"' (quoting Gramatikov v. INS, 128 F.3d 619, 620 (7th Cir.
1997))).
323. See, e.g., Koval v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 798, 807-08 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding that such
reports lack specificity, are of questionable trustworthiness, and cannot be tested through
cross examination); Koliada, 259 F.3d at 487-88 (noting that the State Department report
was prepared for the purpose of the INS litigation).
324. See, e.g., Mullai v. Asheroft, 385 F.3d 635, 639 (6th Cir. 2004) (relying on State
Department reports "describ[ing] the type of general civil disorder and lawlessness" in the
foreign country to find "changed country conditions" sufficient to justify denial of
asylum); see also infra notes 325-29 and accompanying text.
325. Rivera-Cruz v. INS, 948 F.2d 962, 965 (5th Cir. 1991).
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Nicaragua, sought political asylum based on past persecution and the
well-founded fear of future persecution. He met his burden of proof, and
the immigration judge granted his request .326 The INS appealed the
decision mainly on the ground that the political situation in Nicaragua
had changed. The BIA took administrative notice of "commonly
acknowledged facts" suggesting that the group that was supposed to
persecute the claimant was no longer in power. 3" The claimant
unsuccessfully challenged these facts alleging that although the group lost
political power in some sense they still controlled the coercive powers of
the government.3 8 The court held that although it is theoretically
possible that the board might have taken an administrative notice of facts
that are essentially wrong, such taking of notice was not an abuse of
discretion under the circumstances. 29
What changes constitute a fundamental change of government so as to
eliminate a supposed threat is a very difficult question. Too often,
changes are intermediate, transitory, and negotiated settlements of some
kind.
Rarely do governments change fundamentally and former
elements of danger just disappear. 33 ' However, State Department reports
usually overemphasize changes, particularly when a head of state or
government is removed or a peace accord is signed. In Quevedo v.
Ashcroft, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit quoted an asylum
seeker who was denied asylum based on a peace accord supposedly
ending a thirty-six year civil war in Guatemala as saying: "with a paper
and a pencil there is never going to be peace in one country, because
there was always violence and now more.'' The court, however, ruled
that the Department of State Report suggesting that the peace accord
brought about peace in Guatemala was sufficient evidence to meet the
33 2
government's burden of proof for the denial of asylum to the applicant.
326. Id. at 965.
327. Id. at 965-67.
328. See id. at 966.
329. Id. at 967 ("Rivera's attempt to argue officially noticed facts for the first time in
this forum is misplaced," thus the court was "constrained to find that the Board did not
abuse its discretion."); see also Castillo-Villagra v. INS, 972 F.2d 1017, 1028 (9th Cir. 1992)
(finding that the immigration court's taking of administrative notice is reviewable only for
abuse of discretion).
330. See, e.g., Castillo-Villagra, 972 F.2d at 1027 (analyzing the taking of an
administrative notice of changed country conditions in Nicaragua and stating that "[t]he
adjudicative fact required both a debatable assumption about the amount of power
retained by the Sandinistas, and an assumption about the particular salience of the
Castillo-Villagra family as an irritant to Sandinistas who may retain enough power in
Jinotega or the university to persecute them").
331. Quevedo v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 39, 41-42 (1st Cir. 2003).
332. Id. at 42, 45. The use of state department reports of changed country conditions
to deny asylum in circumstances where the nature of the change is not clear is not
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The temptation of presuming facts contained in country condition
reports that on their face purport to be objective is very high. It is also a
very convenient source of evidence. The danger of misinterpretation is,
however, very serious. Obviously, the reports are diplomatic in nature
and are essentially designed to facilitate US foreign policy. The Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has nicely summarized this concern as:
A frank, but official, discussion of the political shortcomings of
a friendly nation is not always compatible with the high duty to
maintain advantageous diplomatic relations .

. .

. No hearing

officer or court has the means to know the diplomatic
necessities of the moment, in the light of which the statements
must be weighed.333
Another reason behind the relaxation of the rules for taking
administrative notice of adjudicative facts is the supposed expertise of
Although such is true in most
the administrative adjudicators.
administrative agencies that adjudicate routine cases, immigration cases
are completely different. No single judge could possibly have expertise
in the dynamic political, social, economic, and security conditions of
more than one hundred countries from which immigrants come. In fact,
immigration judges are not even assigned to specific geographic areas.
Particular expertise in any
Cases are often assigned randomly.
geographic area is not expected. Immigration judges adjudicate cases
just like any district court judge based on the record developed before
them. There is no justification for a significant departure from the rules
of judicial notice in immigration cases. There are few, if any, facts
originating in distant places to which none of the litigating parties have
practical access that are suitable for administrative notice.
Administrative notice is not a helpful tool in deportation proceedings,
particularly in cases where the court needs to determine what happened
in another country in the past and what is likely to happen in the future.
There must not be a convenient 33 4 alternative to proving alleged facts by
reliable evidence in a court of law. The DOL Rules of Evidence contain
uncommon. One Canadian case offers a very good example. In Roble v. Canada, the
claimant, a national of Somalia, sought asylum on the grounds that he was afraid of the
security forces of the then-president of Somalia, Ziad Barre. While the case was still being
considered, Ziad Barre was overthrown. Based on the report about this change, the
Canadian Federal Court of Appeals approved the denial of asylum. See Roble v. Canada
(Minister of Employment and Immigration), 1994 A.C.W.S.J. LEXIS 70543 (Fed. Ct.
Can.). As the world came to recognize soon thereafter, the change in Somalia was for the
worse making the likelihood of persecution greater, not less.
333. Kasravi v. INS, 400 F.2d 675, 677 n.1 (9th Cir. 1968).
334. See Castillo-Villagra,972 F.2d at 1027-28 ("[W]e adopt 'a rule of convenience,'
that 'the ALJ should take notice of adjudicative facts, whenever, the ALl at the hearing
knows of information that will be useful in making the decision."' (quoting Banks v.
Schweiker, 654 F.2d 637, 640-41 (9th Cir. 1981) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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instructive provision in this respect. This alternative is discussed in brief
in the following section.
IV. LESSONS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR RULES OF EVIDENCE

Professors Beatson and Matthews suggest that one important
consideration that needs to be taken into account when considering
functions of administrative bodies and judicial oversight is the diversity
of administrative bodies themselves. 35
They argue that not all
administrative agencies require the same level or kind of check or
scrutiny. They say: "Not all bodies are treated in the same way. 33 6 They
contrast the deference accorded to bodies exercising regulatory powers
relating to commercial and financial matters with the deference accorded
agencies regulating matters involving liberty and related interests.337 In
their own words:
The general theory must, therefore, take account of the relevant
statutory and factual context, the fact that different interests
will not be seen as needing exactly the same type of protection
by the courts and the differing degree to which an issue may be
suitable for resolution by the supervisory jurisdiction. 338
They conclude that the central consideration must be "justiciability"
under the circumstances.339

More than 280 different sets of rules and regulations now govern the
admissibility of evidence in administrative agency proceedings. 34 These
rules could be grouped into two broad categories: those that are
exclusively based on the APA standards, and those that use the FRE "so
far as practicable., 34' In an important departure, in the Spring of 1990,
the DOL adopted an alternative approach-i.e., a set of rules based on
the FRE with some necessary modifications that took the peculiarities of
DOL adversarial proceedings into account.342 The DOL chose this
approach because it was believed that neither the open ended APA rules
nor the ambiguous "so far as practicable" standard was suitable for
adversarial labor proceedings. 343 Although the DOL rules mirror the
335.
336.

BEATSON & MATrHEWS, supranote 13, at 5.
Id.

337.

Id.

338.
339.

Id.
Id.

340. Michael H. Graham, The Case for Model Rules of Evidence in Administrative
Adjudications, 38 FED. B. NEWS & J. 189, 189 (1991).
341. Id.

342. Id. at 190-91; see also 29 C.F.R. §§ 18.101-.1104 (2006).
343. Graham, supra note 340, at 191. Professor Michael H. Graham, who served as a
reporter of the DOL Rules of Evidence, wrote:
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FRE including such details as parallel numbering, they expand the
categories of evidence that are considered trustworthy enough to be
admitted in DOL proceedings. 3' 4 One significant instance in this regard
45
The
is the introduction of five more exceptions to the hearsay rule.
details are discussed in the next section.
Deportation proceedings involve serious liberty interests. As such,
cognizable sets of procedural and evidentiary rules that take this liberty
interest into account are necessary. DOL rules of evidence offer a very
good lesson in devising the rules of evidence that work well under these

unique circumstances. Unlike most other administrative agency rules,36
the DOL rules are based on the Federal Rules of Evidence with
exemplary modifications that take into account the significant interest
There is no disagreement that the rules of evidence
involved.3 47
applicable in regular courts of law provide the best assurances of
trustworthiness. Therefore, as there is no easy formula to guarantee
trustworthiness, significant departures from the classic rules of evidence
must be looked at with the utmost care. It is important to reiterate that

The DOL approach allows the ALI and the parties to rely on an understandable
and workable evidence code, while avoiding the inherent ambiguity involved in a
qualified reference to the FRE. To the extent the rules mirror the FRE, their
meaning is supported by fifteen years of judicial interpretation....
The DOL has approached the question of the admission and exclusion of
evidence in administrative adjudications without resorting to the FRE "so far as
practicable" standard or to the open standard of the APA.
Id.
344. Id.
345. See 29 C.F.R. § 18.803(a)(26)-(30), cited in Graham, supra note 340.
346. Different administrative agencies adopt different rules of procedure and evidence
based essentially on APA rules and the Federal Rules of Evidence. The rules usually take
into account the peculiarities of the adjudicative functions of each agency. For example,
the Surface Transportation Board (STB) rules state:
Any evidence which is sufficiently reliable and probative to support a decision
under the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, or which would be
admissible under the general statutes of the United States, or under the rules of
evidence governing proceedings in matters not involving trial by jury in the
courts of the United States, will be admissible in hearings before the Board.
49 C.F.R. § 1114.1 (2006). The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
rules provide:
Irrelevant, immaterial, privileged, or unduly repetitious evidence shall be
excluded.
Unless otherwise provided for in this part, the Federal Rules of Evidence shall
provide guidance for the conduct of proceedings under this part. Parties may
object to clearly irrelevant material, but technical objections to testimony as used
in a court of law will not be sustained.
24 C.F.R. § 26.23(a) (2007).
347. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (2000); 29 C.F.R. §§ 18.101-1104.
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the significant departures in agency proceedings are rules of convenience
that could compromise the fundamental fairness of any trial.
As consistently argued throughout this Article, there is little
justification for a significant deviation from the classical rules of evidence
that courts of law and equity have used for years unless warranted by
exceptional circumstances. The DOL rules of evidence, by selectively
modifying the Federal Rules of Evidence, create a coherent set of rules
suitable for resolution of disputes falling within the ambit of the
Department of Labor.348
The primary lesson to be drawn from the DOL approach is the very
idea of relying on the Federal Rules. The modifications made to some
specific rules are also very instructive. The following sections briefly
analyze the DOL approach towards specific evidentiary rules and discern
the lessons for deportation proceedings.
A. DOL Standards

The general statutory guidance is that proceedings must "so far as
practicable, be conducted in accordance with the rules of evidence
applicable in the district courts of the United States under the rules of
civil procedure for the district courts of the United States, adopted by the
Supreme Court of the United States. '3 49 This rule comes from the Labor
Relations Management Act (also called the Taft-Hartley Act) that
Congress adopted in 1947 just one year after the adoption of the APA.3 5°
Commenting on the evidentiary standards contained in the National
Labor Relations Bill, the House Committee Report stated that the rules
require the National Labor Relations Board "to rest its rulings upon
facts, not interferences, conjectures, background, imponderables, and
presumed expertise [and to] correct abuses under the Act. 351 A
supplemental report noted: "The Board's earlier habit of accepting
literally anything into the record was indefensible.... [T]he limitation 'so
far as practicable' gives to the trial examiner considerable discretion as to
how closely he will apply the rules of evidence., 352 To clarify the obvious
ambiguities in the "so far as practicable" standard, the DOL issued
regulations dealing with special evidentiary rules in 1990.
The
regulations carefully modified the Federal Rules of Evidence to fit the
348. See Graham, supra note 8, at 358-59; see also 29 C.F.R. §§ 18.101-1104.
349. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b).
350. Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
351.
352.

H.R. REP. NO. 80-245, at 41 (1947), quoted in Graham, supra note 8, at 373.
93 CONG. REC. 7000, 7002 (1947), reprinted in 2 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

BOARD, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT,

at 1622, 1625 (1948), quoted in Graham, supra note 8, at 373.

1947,
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special concerns of the DOL. 353 These rules provide under the title
"Applicability of Federal Rules of Evidence" that "Unless otherwise
provided by statute or these rules, and where appropriate, the Federal
may be applied to all proceedings held pursuant to
Rules of Evidence
35' 4

these rules.
The immigration system could benefit from this approach because the
FRE contain well-conceived rules that courts of law and equity have
successfully used for decades. The modifications that the DOL rules
make also offer good guidance because the typical labor proceedings are

in some ways analogous to deportation proceedings in that there is a
heavy reliance on witness credibility and other testimonial evidence in
both types of proceedings.355 The two processes are also structurally
similar. In both cases, administrative judges preside over adversarial
proceedings relying heavily on testimonial evidence, and make findings
of fact and law based on the record.356 The decisions may be appealed to
the respective boards;.5 . the Board of Immigration Appeals in the case of
immigration, and the National Labor Relations Board in the case of
labor disputes. In both cases, the second stage of appeals goes to the
federal courts of appeal.358
353. See Graham, supra note 8, at 358-59; see also 29 C.F.R. §§ 18.101-1104. The most
serious problem was that there were no standards for determining what constituted "so far
as practicable." Graham, supra note 8, at 359 n.48.
354. According to the Introductory Note to the DOL Rules of Evidence, "The Rules
of Evidence for the United States Department of Labor Modify the Federal Rules of
Evidence for application in formal adversarial adjudications conducted by the United
States Department of Labor. The civil nonjury nature of the hearings and the broad
underlying values and goals of the administrative process are given recognition in these
rules." Graham, supra note 8, at n.154 (quoting 29 C.F.R. Part 18, Subpart B app.
reporter's introductory note (1990)).
355. See Graham, supra note 8, at 372; see also Martin Sprocket & Gear Co. v. NLRB,
329 F.2d 417, 420 (5th Cir. 1964) ("It is settled that credibility of witnesses and reasonable
inferences to be drawn from the evidence are matters for determination by the [NLRB].");
see also discussion supra Part III.C.3.
356. See Graham, supra note 8, at 353-54; supra note 160 and accompanying text.
357. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b) (2007); 29 C.F.R. § 101.11 (2006).
358. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (2000); 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (2000). Moreover, the DOL and the
Immigration Service have a long tradition of information sharing and collaborative work
in relation to immigrant workforce matters. This long-standing relationship should
facilitate the Immigration Service's attempt to understand and emulate the DOL rules and
precedent, as well as create a closer working relationship. The two departments have
traditionally had informal and formal cooperation. The formal cooperation includes the
signing of memoranda of understating. The two most notable memoranda were signed in
1992 and 1998. They dealt with complaints issued by the immigrant workforce to the
Department of Labor. More specifically, they purported to ensure that exploited workers
were not discouraged from filing complaints with the DOL for fear of immigration
See Memorandum of Understanding Between the Immigration &
enforcement.
Naturalization Serv., Dep't of Justice, and the Employment Standards Admin., Dep't of
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The following sections briefly discuss the DOL's approach to the most
important specific evidentiary rules discussed in Part III.D above, and
provide suggestions for the improvement of such rules applicable in
deportation proceedings.
B. Some Specific Rules
1. Limited Admissibility and the Rule of Completeness
As discussed at length in Part III.B above, the INA rules of evidence
do not provide for any meaningful limitation to the admissibility of
evidence in deportation proceedings.
Among some fundamental
evidentiary principles that could help ensure fundamental fairness in
deportation proceedings are the basic principles of limited admissibility
and the rule of completeness. The DOL rules rely on these principles to
ensure fairness in labor proceedings.
The DOL rule of limited admissibility provides: "When evidence
which is admissible as to one party or for one purpose but not admissible
as to another party or for another purpose is admitted, the judge, upon
request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope."35 9 This rule could
be very helpful in screening evidence in deportation proceedings. For
example, a Department of State country condition report could contain
numerous allegations that may be used to prove the truth of what they
assert or to impeach a witness. Some parts of the report might be
relevant to some allegations and admissible for one purpose, but other
parts may be irrelevant and inadmissible. Looking into the admissibility,
relevance, and purpose of each part of the report and determining the
use on a case-by-case basis may be an essential step to prevent
unwarranted and unconditional reliance on the report in its totality.
This rule of limited admissibility may, however, raise concerns of
completeness. The DOL rule of completeness addresses this concern. It
provides: "When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is
introduced by a party, an adverse party may require the introduction at
that time of any other part or any other writing or recorded statement
which ought in fairness to be considered contemporaneously with it." 36
The key language here is the reference to fairness. The court must
determine that the missing portions "ought in fairness" be considered.
The rule of completeness may also play a significant role with respect
to other evidence in deportation proceedings. Sometimes portions of
airport interview forms and other documents are presented to the court
Labor (Nov. 23, 1998) (replacing the 1992 Memorandum of Understanding), available at
http://www.dol.gov/esa/whatsnew/whd/mou/nov98mou.htm.
359. 29 C.F.R. § 18.105 (2006).

360. Id. § 18.106.
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to contradict the claimant's testimony or undermine the case in other
ways.3 6' The rule of completeness would mandate the presentation of all
documents that "ought in fairness" be considered together.
Another area where the rule of completeness could facilitate fair
disposition of deportation cases is the production of criminal records.
For example, in the case discussed above that this author supervised, the
DHS presented conviction records that apparently showed the
respondent's conviction for receiving stolen property and a sentence for
six to twenty-three months under Pennsylvania law. Examination of the
whole record revealed that the penalty was in fact probation. Parts of
the record showed that the probation was actually given on a preprinted
regular probation certificate. That meant a difference of life and death
for the respondent because a suspended sentence of six to twenty-three
months would have excluded him from any kind of reasonable relief
under the immigration law. 362 Probation of twenty-three months, on the
other hand, would have had absolutely no serious immigration
363
consequences. As this example suggests, the rule of completeness used
along with the rule of limited admissibility could be a valuable tool to
ensure the fairness of deportation proceedings.
2. Administrative Notice

The DOL rules contain a detailed rule regulating the circumstances of
relying on administrative notice of adjudicative facts. This rule is entirely
compatible with deportation proceedings. It provides:
(b) ... An officially noticed fact must be one not subject to

reasonable dispute in that it is either:
(1) Generally known within the local area,
(2) Capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to
sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned, or
(3) Derived from a not reasonably questioned scientific,
medical or other technical process, technique, principle, or
explanatory theory within the administrative agency's
specialized field of knowledge.

(e) . . . A party is entitled, upon timely request, to an

opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of taking official
361. See, e.g., Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 2004).
362. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
363. See generally INA § 101, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(43) (West 2005) (defining
"aggravated felony" as one of a variety of offenses "for which the term of imprisonment
[is] at least one year").
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notice and the tenor of the matter noticed. In the absence of
prior notification, the request may be made after official notice
has been taken. 6 4
In stark contrast to the INA rules discussed in Part III.D.4 above, this
rule relies on the FRE and regulates the details of the circumstances of
taking administrative notice of adjudicative facts without proof. It
employs a very high threshold of knowledge and verification for
administrative notice to be taken. Moreover, it emphasizes the need to
provide the adversely affected party with a clear opportunity to challenge
the appropriateness of the taking of the administrative notice. These
details are essential because they help ensure the reliability of the
evidence. This again is a very instructive provision suitable for
deportation proceedings.
3. Hearsay

Hearsay is perhaps the most important and also the most controversial
of all evidentiary rules. A clear rule on hearsay would undoubtedly
improve the justiciability, predictability, and consistency of deportation
proceedings. As discussed in Part III.D.5 above, the INA rules of
evidence do not impose any limitation on the admissibility of hearsay
evidence.
That has indeed been a source of serious difficulty.
Restricting the admissibility of hearsay and regulating the admissibility of
reliable hearsay through exceptions as the Federal Rules do is a proven
approach. The DOL approach of expanding the exceptions to
accommodate peculiar and legitimate concerns is very useful.
The DOL rules adopt the general FRE rule against the admissibility of
hearsay together with all the exceptions. 65 The DOL rules, however, add
five more exceptions to the generally recognized exceptions under the
FRE.366 These exceptions take the peculiarities of the proceedings before
the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) into account.367

For

example, one exception provides for the admission of expert reports
without the availability of the expert to testify in court. 368 Obviously, this
364. 29 C.F.R. § 18.201.
365. Id. § 18.802 ("Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules, or by
rules or regulations of the administrative agency prescribed pursuant to statutory
authority, or pursuant to executive order or Act of Congress."); id. § 18.803 (providing
exceptions to the general hearsay rule).
366. See id. § 18.803(a)(26)-(30).
367. See Graham, supra note 8, at 376-82.
368. See 29 C.F.R. § 18.803(a)(28) ("Written reports of an expert witness prepared
with a view toward litigation, including but not limited to a diagnostic report of a
physician, including inferences and opinions, when on official letterhead, when dated,
when including a statement of the expert's qualifications, when including a summary of
experience as an expert witness in litigation, when including the basic facts, data, and
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exception weighs the potential trustworthiness of the evidence along with
the costs and benefits. It allows the adverse party to call the expert for
purposes of testing the testimony through cross-examination.
Although the report would still be admissible even if the expert does not
appear upon the request of the adverse party, its weight would certainly
be affected.
The report must be accompanied by the witness's
credentials indicating his experience, including trial experience if any,
and must state the basis of the testimony.37 ° Such evidence may be
deemed inadmissible if "the sources of information or the 3 method
or
71
circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. ,
This exception, which is a result of careful drafting, took routine labor
litigations into account. This particular exception to the hearsay rule
could be a very valuable tool if adopted in deportation proceedings
because individuals in deportation proceedings often lack the resources
to produce expert witnesses to testify in court. A rule that allows the
admissibility of expert reports such as this may be very helpful. The rules
that test the trustworthiness must not, however, be overlooked. That is
why the details contained in this DOL rule are indeed instructive.
One important piece of evidence often used in deportation
proceedings that may be admitted under a similar exception is the
Department of State country condition report. As indicated above,
allowing its unconditional admission has been a source of great concern.
A complete exclusion also would not be wise as it often contains valuable
information for both parties that would otherwise be unavailable. A rule
may, however, regulate its admissibility and the weight that must be
assigned to it. More particularly, a rule should provide that the party
adversely affected by the admission of the Report must be given the
opportunity to challenge any parts of the Report that the adverse party
relies on. A party may even be allowed to challenge any portion of the
report by showing that "the sources of information or the method or
opinions forming the basis of the inferences or opinions, and when including the reasons
for or explanation of the inferences and opinions, so far as admissible under rules of
evidence applied as though the witness was then present and testifying, unless the sources
of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of
trustworthiness, provided that a copy of the report has been filed and served upon the
adverse party sufficiently in advance of the hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair
opportunity to prepare to object or meet it. The adverse party may not object to the
admissibility of the report unless the adverse party files and serves written objection
thereto sufficiently in advance of the hearing stating the objections, and the grounds
therefor, that the adverse party will make if the report is offered at the time of the hearing.
An adverse party may call the expert as a witness and examine the witness as if under
cross-examination.").
369.
370.

See id.
Id.

371.

Id.
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circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness" just like
the DOL exception to expert reports.
Another valuable example is the exception relating to written
statements of lay witnesses. It provides:
Written statements of a lay witness made under oath or
affirmation and subject to the penalty of perjury, so far as
admissible under the rules of evidence applied as though the
witness was then present and testifying, unless the sources of
information or the method or circumstances of preparation
indicate lack of trustworthiness provided that (i) a copy of the
written statement has been filed and served upon the adverse
party sufficiently in advance of the hearing to provide the
adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to object or
meet it, and (ii) if the declarant is reasonably available as a
witness, as determined by the judge, no adverse party has
sufficiently in advance of the hearing filed and served upon the
noticing party a written demand that the declarant be produced
in person to testify at the hearing. An adverse party may call
the declarant as a witness and examine the witness as if under
cross-examination.372
While this exception serves the purposes of cost effective and
convenient disposition of cases, the details contained therein are clearly
designed to maintain minimum indicia of reliability and trustworthiness.
A similar provision for deportation proceedings would have many
benefits. It would allow the Service as well as the individuals involved in
deportation proceedings to present written testimony while at the same
time allowing the party adversely affected by the testimony some
practical guarantees. This rule may be modified further to ensure the
admissibility of written testimony from overseas, when it is practically
impossible to produce the witness, as long as the testimony is given under
oath and carries some indicia of reliability. The addition of this
exception is particularly valuable for asylum seekers who are otherwise
unable to present witnesses who may be in some distant location but can
provide written testimony.
V. CONCLUSION

The sheer irregularity and unpredictability of deportation proceedings
may call the integrity and sincerity of the system of administration of
immigration law itself into question. In his dissenting opinion in Fong
Yue Ting v. United States, Justice Field remarked:

372. Id. § 18.803(a)(29).
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If one rule may lawfully be laid aside in his case, another rule
may also be laid aside, and all rules may be discarded. In such
instances a rule of evidence may be set aside in one case, a rule
of pleading in another, the testimony of eye-witnesses may be
rejected and hearsay adopted, or no evidence at all may be
received . . . . That would be to establish a pure, simple,
undisguised despotism and tyranny with respect to foreigners
resident in the country by its consent, and such an exercise of
power is not permissible under our Constitution. 373
Justice's Field's century old concern is still real. As consistently argued
throughout this Article, appropriate rules of procedure and evidence
could help mitigate the harsh consequences of the application of
substantive law and ensure consistency, credibility, and predictability of
deportation proceedings. To this end, the Federal Rules of Evidence
that apply in both civil and criminal trials 74 must offer the basic
foundation for any rules of evidence applicable in deportation
proceedings. The significant departure from these classic procedural and
evidentiary rules in deportation proceedings has been a source of serious
anomaly. The Federal Rules of Evidence modified along the lines of the
DOL rules would indeed inject badly needed reliability, predictability,
and consistency into deportation proceedings and help restore the
integrity of the system.

373.

Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 754-56 (1893) (Field, J., dissenting).

374.

See FED. R. EvID. 1101(b) ("These rules apply generally to civil actions and

proceedings, including admiralty and maritime cases, to criminal cases and proceedings, to
contempt proceedings except those in which the court may act summarily, and to
proceedings and cases under title 11, United States Code.").

